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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at the implications for public policy of the existence of ethical consumers 
and altruistic agents like Fairtrade. It is argued that there are market failures in the provision 
of “fair” goods, which may justify public policy. Of such market failures, the most important 
seems to be in the provision of ethical information about the goods. Searching and 
summarizing such information to make it useful for ethical consumption might mean large 
costs, but when this information is first produced and summarized in an ethical product label 
on goods, it makes ethical consumption easy for the consumer. Therefore ethical information 
seems to have the characteristics of a public good. The need for public intervention is 
reduced by the existence of altruistic agents like Fairtrade, who certify fair products and 
label them for the consumers. However, such labelling has so far mainly concerned simple 
products, often primary products like coffee. Labelling products with a more complex and 
less transparent production chain may require more resources, and therefore public support. 
 I set up a partial equilibrium model to study the implications of different public 
policies. One type of public policy aims to facilitate ethical consumption by providing 
consumers with information and/or an alternative. Another type of public policy, regulation, 
goes further and removes the option of “unfair” goods. This could be done e.g. through 
international standards for labour and the environment. Providing consumers with 
information may have predominantly negative welfare effects if there is no fair alternative. 
On the other hand, requiring fair production may be harmful if consumer fairness is low, or 
consumers are not informed. Ethical consumption might therefore be harmful without ethical 
production, and vice versa. Ensuring a fair alternative to consumers, like Fairtrade does, 
seems both to offer most of the positive effects, while minimizing potential negative effects. 
However, to the extent that it is too costly for agents like Fairtrade to label some types of 
products, public policy may be needed to ensure a fair alternative. 
 
 
ii 
  
Preface 
 
Supervisor at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo was Professor Jon 
Vislie. Co-supervisor at the Norwegian Institute for Consumer Research was Arne Dulsrud. I 
would like to thank both for countless valuable comments and suggestions as well as 
stimulating discussions, that helped me define the topic of this thesis, and greatly improved 
the result.  
The thesis was written as a part of the Norwegian Institute of Consumer Research’s 
project on Ethical-political consumption, as project 151-03 Etisk-politisk forbruk in 
Vitenskapsbutikken at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Oslo. I would like 
to thank the Norwegian Institute for Consumer Research for the use of their student room for 
a long time, and the people there for help with finding useful literature and for discussions. 
It was inspiring for me that many people around me found the topic of this thesis 
engaging. I would like to thank all who have given comments and discussed it with me. 
These include friends and family, and fellow economics students. A special thanks to Anna 
Milford for many valuable comments. Also thanks to participants at the NORAD seminars in 
2006 on trade with developing countries for interesting discussions.  
Of course, remaining errors and weaknesses are my responsibility. 
 
iii 
  
Contents 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... i 
 
Preface..................................................................................................................... ii 
 
Contents ................................................................................................................. iii 
 
1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 5 
 
2 About Fairtrade ................................................................................................ 9 
2.1 The problems facing many workers and producers in the South ...................... 9 
2.2 The history of Fairtrade....................................................................................... 10 
2.3 The Fairtrade system and the standards............................................................ 10 
2.4 Fairtrade and a just distribution of the gains from trade ................................ 11 
2.5 Economic theory on Fairtrade ............................................................................ 14 
 
3     Fair consumers and economic modelling ................................................... 18 
3.1       Ethical-political consumption.............................................................................. 18 
3.2 Ethical investment and CSR................................................................................ 20 
3.3 Criticism of ethical consumption and CSR ........................................................ 21 
3.4 Ethical consumption and CSR versus legislation .............................................. 22 
3.5 Economic modelling of preferences for Fairtrade............................................. 22 
3.6 Fairtrade versus direct aid .................................................................................. 27 
 
4 Market failures in the provision of fair goods ............................................. 28 
4.1 Information about the ethical characteristics of goods..................................... 28 
4.2 Ethical risk ............................................................................................................ 28 
4.3 Consumer strategy 1: Search for ethical information ...................................... 29 
4.4 Consumer strategy 2: Buy “safe” products ....................................................... 30 
4.5 Ethical product labelling: a public good? .......................................................... 30 
4.6 Can private labelling schemes provide sufficient fair labelling? ..................... 31 
4.7 Other costs of ethical consumption ..................................................................... 33 
 
5 Public policy................................................................................................... 35 
5.1 A model framework.............................................................................................. 35 
5.1.1 Individuals in the North............................................................................... 35 
5.1.2 Production in the North and in the South .................................................. 40 
5.1.3   Individuals in the South .................................................................................... 46 
5.2 Public policy 1: Ethical labelling of all goods from the South.......................... 47 
5.2.1 Welfare in the South..................................................................................... 47 
5.2.2 Welfare in the North .................................................................................... 53 
5.3 Public policy 2: Ensure a fair alternative........................................................... 56 
5.3.1 Welfare in the South..................................................................................... 57 
5.3.2 Welfare in the North .................................................................................... 59 
5.4 Public policy 3: International standards ............................................................ 61 
iv 
  
5.4.1 Welfare in the South..................................................................................... 62 
5.4.2 Welfare in the North .................................................................................... 64 
5.5 Public policy 4: Public ethical investment.......................................................... 67 
5.6   Extension: Consumer trust as a public good for firms ......................................... 67 
5.7   More on public policy............................................................................................... 68 
 
6   Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 69 
 
References ............................................................................................................ 74 
 
Appendix A      Fairtrade producer standards principles .................................. 81 
 
Appendix B Some sources of ethical information ......................................... 83 
 
Appendix C Fairtrade towns ............................................................................ 84 
 
Appendix D Fairtrade products in Norwegian supermarket chains ............. 85 
 
 
List of tables 
5.1 Welfare effects in the South from fair labelling……………………………………. 48 
5.2 Welfare effects in the North from fair labelling……………………………………. 53 
5.3 Welfare effects in the South from guaranteeing a fair alternative…………………. 57 
5.4 Welfare effects in the North from guaranteeing a fair alternative…………………. 59 
5.5 Welfare effects in the South from international standards…………………………. 61 
5.6 Welfare effects in the North from international standards…………………………. 64
  
5 
  
1 Introduction1 
 
Fairtrade means among other things that farmers from poor countries receive a guaranteed 
minimum price for their produce, or that workers receive a minimum wage, that they have 
good working conditions, and that production is environmentally-friendly. In exchange, 
consumers in the developed countries agree to pay a higher price in the shops. Fairtrade came 
about because many people thought that conventional trade was unfair and did not benefit the 
poor in the South. Small coffee farmers, for example, have for a long time had a difficult 
situation with low and fluctuating coffee prices.2 To help them, some consumers want to pay a 
little extra for “fair” coffee.  
Fairtrade is now one of the fastest growing markets in the world, with over 20 percent 
increased sales annually since 2000.3 The Fairtrade market share has also become significant 
for some products. In Switzerland, for example, 47 percent of all bananas are labelled 
Fairtrade, and in the UK 20 percent of the ground coffee is fair. Also in Norway Fairtrade is 
growing fast, with sales increasing with 28 percent from 2003 to 2004. Still, however, only 
1.5 percent of the coffee sold in Norway is Fairtrade.  
In general, “fair” products make up a very small share of total trade between the North 
and the South, and for many products there exists no fair alternative. The starting point for 
this thesis was a thought experiment of an agreement with the principles of Fairtrade applied 
to all products from the South. Many people wish to see the gains from trade and 
globalization divided more equally, and to ensure that the gains reach everybody. However, it 
is also often argued that countries in the South cannot afford what we see as decent wages and 
working conditions and protection of the environment, and that we have to wait until they 
have achieved a higher income level.4 Fairtrade could be seen as an answer to this. By paying 
a higher price for products from the South, in exchange for a guarantee that basic standards 
for work and the environment are respected, consumers in the North could help the South 
achieve faster development.5 
This presupposes that consumers are willing to pay extra for the costs of ensuring 
decent working conditions in the South. The reason that so little of world trade is Fairtrade 
could be that most consumers do not in fact have the willingness to pay. However, to 
                                                 
1 This chapter contains some material from Rygh (2006). 
2 See section 2.1. 
3 The figures are from Fairtrade Advocacy Office (2005:5-7 and 57). 
4 See Snoen (2004), Henderson (2001), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and Lomborg (2001). 
5 See also Rygh (2005). 
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conclude in this way, we have to suppose that the markets are well-functioning in the sense 
that consumers’ preferences for Fairtrade are accommodated. Alternative explanations of the 
low share of Fairtrade are market failures in the provision of fair goods, of which the most 
important seems to be information about the ethical characteristics of goods. The general 
argument is as follows. When a consumer considers buying a product from the South, he or 
she does not know whether the product has not been produced using child labour, with bad 
working conditions and subsistence wages, or large environmental problems. This can lead 
the consumer to feel ethical risk.  
To reduce ethical risk, the consumer can either search ethical information about the 
good, or buy a good that he or she considers ethically “safe”. The consumer may for instance 
trust that products in the North have been produced in a fair manner because of legislation. As 
for ethical information, there exist many sources, like specialized ethical consumer 
magazines, and a large number of internet sites. However, there may be high costs associated 
with finding and making use of such information for ethical consumption. For all except the 
most concerned consumers, these costs might be near prohibitive. In some cases, information 
may also simply be unavailable. 
 On the other hand, if the relevant ethical information could be summarized in a simple 
“ethical” product label, it would be costlessly available to all consumers, and make ethical 
consumption easier. I therefore argue that ethical information has the main characteristic of a 
public good: There are large fixed costs in searching and summarizing information, but when 
this is first done, the costs of allowing an additional consumer access to this information are 
negligible. Free-rider problems then mean that we could then have a too low supply of ethical 
information in a private market, which means that there might be a role for public policy. 
 However, an important objection against the need of public involvement is exactly that 
there have been established private labelling schemes like Fairtrade, that guarantee consumers 
a fair alternative. These altruistic agents are willing to incur the costs associated with fair 
labelling, and thus help correct the market failure in ethical information. Does this mean that 
public policy after all is unnecessary? 
 Here the fact that Fairtrade labelling currently exists only for certain products, mostly 
primary products like coffee, could be of importance. One possible explanation for this fact 
might be that certain characteristics of primary products make producers especially 
vulnerable. For example, supply and demand conditions may make the income from 
agricultural production highly volatile. One could therefore argue that there is less need for 
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Fairtrade in other products. However, also in other industries like the textile industry and even 
the production of mobile phones there have been many reports of bad working conditions. 
To me, a more plausible explanation for the fact that there is Fairtrade in some 
products, but not others, is that there are differences between products in how easy it is to 
verify that production is fair. It is probably easier to ensure fair production of a “simple” 
product like coffee, than of products that have a longer and more complex production chain. 
To the extent that labelling other products requires more resources, it is therefore possible that 
it will be too costly for private altruistic agents like Fairtrade. 
As for public policy, there are several options available. One strategy could be to label 
all products from the South, so that consumers can choose between fair and unfair products. 
However, there may not always be a fair alternative available. A second possibility is to 
ensure that consumers have the option of a fair good. These two strategies imply public 
intervention through helping consumers in their ethical consumption.  
But many are sceptical of what ethical consumption can achieve in addressing the 
problems of globalisation, and instead call for international legislation, e.g. through standards 
for labour and the environment in the World Trade Organization (WTO).6 However, 
developing countries oppose such standards, fearing they will work as hidden protectionism 
from the North countries, and mean reduced competitiveness.7 If standards lead to reduced 
trade, they could have negative effects for the South. On the other hand, if fair North 
consumers are willing to pay for the costs of fulfilling standards, trade need not be reduced.  
In this thesis, I set up a partial equilibrium model to study the welfare implications of 
different public policies, and the relationship between them. The aim is to arrive at broad 
policy suggestions. In addition, I hope the work can help identify important topics for future 
research.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, I present Fairtrade in more 
detail, and discuss some previous economic literature on Fairtrade. The literature has so far 
mainly focused on the production side. Some of this literature points out how fair trade can 
address specific market failures. The critical literature claims instead that Fairtrade by 
introducing distortions in the market has unintended and harmful side-effects. An evaluation 
of some of these arguments requires a closer look at the consumer side in Fairtrade. This is 
done in chapter 3. I start with placing Fairtrade in the broader context of ethical consumption, 
and related phenomena like ethical investment and corporate social responsibility. While most 
                                                 
6 Among them are the current Norwegian government (Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 55). 
7 Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Bourguinat (2005), Eriksen and Tretvoll (2006). 
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economic theory is based on self-interested agents, with Fairtrade it seems obvious that one 
must include preferences for other agents. As a preparation for the analysis, I discuss how 
consumers’ preferences for Fairtrade should be modelled, drawing on economic theory on 
social preferences. The choice of modelling strategy is shown to have important implications 
for the results of the analysis. 
In Chapter 4, I present in more detail the argument that ethical labelling is a public 
good, and discuss some objections. I also discuss some other costs for the consumer of ethical 
consumption, besides searching ethical information. In chapter 5, I set up a model to study the 
welfare effects of different public policies in the North and the South. The model incorporates 
ethical risk over a good from the South, and assumes that ethical labelling is the consumers’ 
only source of ethical information, i.e. that the costs of searching ethical information are 
prohibitive. The effects of the different public policies will be shown to depend on the 
assumptions made about consumers’ preferences, information, and their beliefs about the 
fairness of production in developing countries, as well as on the reactions of South firms. I 
conclude chapter 5 by giving an overview of more fine-tuned policy alternatives. In chapter 6 
I sum up the main results, discuss some reservations to the analysis, and give suggestions for 
future research.
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2 About Fairtrade  
 
In chapter 2, I describe Fairtrade more closely. Fairtrade arose because consumers wanted to 
help producers and workers in the South who experience problems. In section 2.1 I describe 
some of these problems. A brief historical overview of Fairtrade is given in section 2.2, and a 
closer presentation of the Fairtrade system and standards in section 2.3. However, the 
emphasis in this thesis will not be on details about the Fairtrade system, but rather on the 
general idea of Fairtrade.  
Fairtrade presupposes a theory of justice. Some possible theories are discussed in 
section 2.4, with weight on a just distribution from the gains from trade. This means that there 
will also be a brief discussion of the gains from trade for developing countries. In section 2.5, 
I present some of the existing economic literature on Fairtrade. 
 
2.1 The problems facing many workers and producers in the South 
The situation of many coffee producers is described by Milford (2004:1). The coffee 
producers are based in rural areas where the infrastructure is poor and the level of service 
provision is low. They have an insecure income because of fluctuating international coffee 
prices. For many years, coffee prices showed a downward trend, reaching a record low in 
2001. In the last couple of years, coffee prices have started to increase, but it will be some 
time before poor coffee producers gain from this.8 Milford further argues that local 
purchasing markets for coffee are often characterised by imperfect competition, and that the 
lack of information and infrastructure make the farmers vulnerable to market failures such as 
cartels. Studies of the value chain for coffee have showed that only a small portion of what 
the consumer pays for coffee accrues to the producer, and this portion is getting smaller. 
Milford cites a recent study which showed that coffee farmers today receive only around 6 
percent of the value of a pack of coffee sold in a store.9 There are also great problems in the 
production of many other primary products, like bananas and cocoa.10 
 Recently, Western consumers have become concerned about the conditions for 
workers in factories in developing countries. So-called sweatshops have often been revealed 
                                                 
8 Aftenposten, morgen, 23.08.2006, Økonomi, p. 6. 
9 Milford (2004:7). 
10 See e.g. Ransom (2001). 
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in connection with the activities of transnational companies, and were brought to consumers’ 
attention by among others Klein (2000).11 For most of the products produced here there exists 
no Fairtrade alternative.  
 
2.2 The history of Fairtrade 
”Fair trade” as an idea is at least 50 years old, when community and church organizations in 
Europe and North America started buying products from other community organizations in 
the developing countries (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) 2006c:2). 
Milford (2004:8) writes that in the 1960s, Fairtrade came up as a response to developing 
countries’ dissatisfaction with their terms of trade. Alternative Trading Organizations (ATOs) 
started selling products from developing countries directly to concerned consumers in the 
North through “alternative” markets, where the producers were paid above the market price. 
The ATOs were typically responsible both for the importing, the distribution and the sale of 
the products, often in specialized “world shops”.  
 The first Fairtrade label, with the name Max Havelaar, was created in the Netherlands 
in 1988. It was the result of a request from a Mexican cooperative of coffee producers who 
wanted help to market their product in Europe (Renard 2003). Today’s Fairtrade labelling 
schemes, instead of using their own distributive networks, use the conventional networks, and 
Fairtrade products have also moved into traditional shops and supermarkets. Any commercial 
company can buy products from producers in the South and have its products Fairtrade 
certified, and sell them in the supermarket with a “Fairtrade” label. Compared to the old ATO 
system, this means lower costs and allows Fairtrade products to reach a much larger number 
of consumers than before (FLO 2006c:2, Milford 2004:8).  
 
2.3 The Fairtrade system and the standards12 
For a product to be Fairtrade certified, it must fulfil a number of standards. All buyers of the 
products have to pay the Fairtrade minimum price and/or a Fairtrade premium to the 
producers. The minimum price is meant to cover the costs of sustainable production. There is 
a Fairtrade premium when the world market price exceeds this price, which the producers and 
                                                 
11 This does not however imply that conditions in poor countries would have been better without transnational 
companies. Rather, conditions in poor countries have become more visible to Western consumers through 
economic integration and the activities of companies with well-known brands. See Becchetti and Rosati (2005) 
and Engler (2006). As Gaarder (2004:74) points out, sweatshops are not limited to developing countries, but are 
found also in some developed countries. 
12 The information in this section is taken from FLO (2006b, 2006c). 
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workers are meant to use in improving their situation. Producers may also ask for pre-
financing.  
The standards are set by Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO). FLO 
was established in 1997 and is an association of currently 21 different National labelling 
initiatives.13 FLO does not trade itself, but only certifies products. FLO researches and sets the 
Fairtrade Standard, the Fairtrade minimum price and the Fairtrade premium. The certification 
of the producers and the supply chains is carried out by the independent commercial company 
FLO-Cert. FLO and FLO-Cert are based in Germany. They only work with producer 
organizations and workers in developing countries. National Initiatives license the 
international Fairtrade Mark to use on products which respect Fairtrade standards and which 
are sold in their country. They also work to spread the understanding of Fairtrade and issues 
in international trade, and encourage customers to buy Fairtrade products. Most National 
Initiatives are based in developed countries, but recently some countries in the South have 
also established National Inititatives. 
Different products have different standards, which reflects the fact the problems that 
producers and workers in developing countries experience are different from product to 
product.14 For example, most of the coffee and cocoa is grown by independent small farmers, 
who work on their own land and market their produce through a local co-operative. For these 
producers, receiving a minimum price for their beans is the most important aspect of 
Fairtrade. On the other hand, most tea, for example, is grown on estates. For workers 
employed on tea plantations, the most important concern is fair wages and decent working 
conditions. There are therefore two sets of Fairtrade Generic Standards, one for small farmers 
and one for hired labour situations. FLO’s (2006e) introduction to these standards is given in 
appendix A. I will however not enter into detail about the Fairtrade standards, but discuss the 
idea of Fairtrade more generally. 
 
2.4 Fairtrade and a just distribution of the gains from trade  
In this section I discuss briefly the moral-philosophical ideas behind Fairtrade. The concept of 
fair trade implies on the one hand what most economists agree on, namely that trade is 
beneficial. On the other hand, Fairtrade also implies some criteria for how trade should be 
conducted, and how the gains should be distributed. A first perspective is the distribution of 
the gains from trade between countries. Even though trade leads to net gains, it is possible that 
                                                 
13 Among them is the Norwegian Fairtrade Max Havelaar. 
14 See FLO (2006e).  
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North uses its economic muscle to take the lion’s share of these gains. Further, when 
economists talk about the gains from trade, they are not saying that nobody will lose from 
trade. Trade might lead to net gains for a developing country as a whole, while some people in 
the country are worse off. The winners could then in theory compensate the losers, and 
everybody would be better off.15 However, in practice such compensation often does not 
happen. Even if trade means an improvement for them, the gain of poor producers might be 
marginal. An important aim of Fairtrade is to allow poor producers to keep more of the gains 
themselves.16 
 The gains from trade for a developing country are discussed by Appleyard, Field and 
Cobb (2006:411-2). Trade theory says that if there is a difference between the domestic 
relative prices in autarky and the relative prices internationally, a country can increase its 
welfare by specializing in and exporting the relatively less expensive domestic good and 
importing the goods that are relatively more expensive. There will be a relative expansion of 
the sector(s) using relatively intensively the abundant factor. In the case of most developing 
countries, there will be increased incentives to expand labour-intensive production rather than 
modern, capital-intensive production. This means expanding agriculture, primary goods and 
labour-intensive manufactured goods. International trade therefore increases employment and 
puts upward pressure on wages, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Even if the economy is not 
able to specialize right away, it will still enjoy the increased consumption possibilities made 
possible by trade. 
 Appleyard, Field and Cobb (2006:412) mention some reasons why in practice the 
static gains from specialization for developing countries might be limited. First, if there is 
high unemployment, as is usually the case in developing countries, the effect of increased 
demand for labour on the wage level might be limited. In addition, the lower income and price 
elasticities of such products, and in particular the instable supply of agricultural products due 
to factors like the weather, a greater specialization in these goods can give a more unstable 
income. An example of a product with this problem is coffee (Milford 2004:4). This could 
provide one economic rationale for a guaranteed minimum price (Becchetti and Rosati 
2005:6).  
 Besides static gains from trade, there are dynamic gains. These include realization of 
economies of scale following access to larger international markets, and technology transfer 
(e.g. the product cycle). Some argue that when dynamic effects from trade are taken into 
                                                 
15 This is called the compensation principle (Hausman and McPherson 1996:97-8). 
16 FLO (2006c:3). 
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account, specialization based on current comparative advantage may be harmful for long-term 
economic development. For example, it has been argued that specializing in agricultural 
products might be unfortunate because industrial production gives better opportunities for 
growth in the long run. However, I will not go into this debate here.17  
 I now discuss briefly how theories of justice may be used in connection with trade. 
Fairtrade has often explicitly stated that they are paying a fair price, rather than the market 
price. Recently the fairness dimension seems to have been downplayed somewhat, and the 
emphasis is now on how Fairtrade can help marginalised producers into international market, 
and provide extra benefits for them and the community around them (see FLO 2006c:2). 
The fairness dimension has also been interpreted differently in the literature on 
Fairtrade. Maseland and de Vaal (2002:254) divide the “fairness” of Fairtrade into two 
distinct concepts: That we have a moral obligation to 1) pay a fair price for 2) a product that 
has been produced under decent conditions. In other words, fair trade involves on the one 
hand some minimum requirements for trade with respect to working conditions. As Maseland 
and de Vaal (2002:256) note, these are absolute requirements without which it does not make 
sense to talk about fair trade. The fair price, on the other hand, they argue is essentially a pure 
income transfer.18 The concept of fairness they use for this is that trade should improve the 
situation of the worst off, in this case poor producers in the South.19  
Adriani and Becchetti (2004:6) in their analysis of Fairtrade in monopsonistic labour 
markets identify a fair wage with the competitive wage, which they argue can be considered 
as the wage when the two counterparts have equal bargaining power. On the other hand, the 
liberalistic philosophy of Nozick (1974) would probably say that any outcome of trade is fair, 
as long as trade is voluntary. Considerations like equal bargaining power are then irrelevant.20  
 A satisfactory discussion of theories of justice and trade would of course require a 
thesis in itself. With the preceding brief discussion as a background, I now move on to look at 
some economic literature on Fairtrade. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Appleyard, Field and Cobb (2006), Almås (2005) and Snoen (2004) for a discussion. 
18 However, they also argue that a higher price could be used to pay for the costs of respecting standards (p.270). 
19 Maseland and de Vaal (2002:footnote on p.256) note that this concept is similar to John Rawls’ (1971) ideas 
of social justice. 
20 This is my impression which is based on excerpts from Nozick (1974) cited in Beauchamp (2001:315-9), as 
well as on Hausman and McPherson (1996:132-3). However, this requires that today’s situation is the result of 
past justice, so it is probably more correct to say that in principle any outcome of trade could be fair. 
14 
  
2.5 Economic theory on Fairtrade 
In this section I briefly present some of the earlier economic literature on Fairtrade, which so 
far has mainly concentrated on the production side. Interestingly, the literature theorizes either 
that Fairtrade can address specific market failures, and can therefore be beneficial; or that it 
rather creates new market distortions, and thus may have adverse side-effects. A recurring 
theme is also that while it seems to be helping the people that participate in the system, 
Fairtrade may hurt others.  
 I first look at the literature that sees Fairtrade as a possible answer to market 
imperfections, notably problems of monopsony. Adriani and Becchetti (2004) study the entry 
of a fair trader into a market previously dominated by a firm with monopsony power in the 
South labour market. As mentioned above, in their model fairness means exactly that the firm 
pays the workers the value of their marginal product of labour.21 The entry of the fair trader 
can lead to a welfare improvement both for the consumers in the North that are concerned 
with fairness, and for workers in the South. If the fair trader can take any size, all workers in 
the South will experience a welfare improvement, as the monopsonist will then have to pay 
the competitive wage to attract any workers at all. There will then only be produced fair 
products. If the fair trader is size-constrained, there is a critical size it needs to reach in order 
for all workers to experience a welfare improvement.22 Interestingly, if it does not reach this 
size, its entry might lead to lower wages for the workers in the unfair firm, and unemployment 
for some workers.23 
 Milford (2004) studies Fairtrade via its effect on coffee–purchasing co-operatives in an 
area with oligopolistic or monopsonistic buyers of coffee. There are several ways in which the 
coffee co-operatives can improve the situation of the rural poor.24 In theory, they can 
distribute the profits that would otherwise be retained by middlemen, to themselves. This 
means that they can offer a better price than their private competitors, which may enhance 
competition among local coffee purchasers. This effect however depends on what type of co-
operative we are discussing, which I will not go into here, but we note that in Milford’s model 
the entrance of a co-operative might lead to negative effects for the producers who are not 
members of the co-operative.25 However, as Milford points out, the co-operative might have 
some positive effects beyond the model. They may for instance work as what Helmberger 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, this also increases the value of the marginal product of labour. 
22 In addition, the fair trade needs to be able to efficiently ration the labour supply by recruiting the workers with 
the worst outside options (Adriani and Becchetti 2004:14). 
23 Adriani and Becchetti (2004:18).  
24 Milford (2004:64-65). 
25 Milford (2004:26). 
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called “barometers of exploitation”, indicating to non-cooperative workers the extent to which 
they are being exploited by the oligopolistic coffee buyers. The coffee buyers might then have 
to offer a better price in order to avoid that the farmers take actions like creating their own co-
operative. The effect of the Fairtrade price premium is as a subsidy to worker-owned co-
operatives which may allow them to have this pro-competitive effect. 
Becchetti and Rosati (2005:5-6) mention other ways in which Fairtrade criteria may 
reduce market imperfections. For example, the opportunity of pre-financing production may 
help reduce problems with monopolistic moneylenders and credit rationing for small 
uncollaterized producers. Attention to the environmental sustainability of production may 
reduce problems with externalities. An important effect of Fairtrade may also be to facilitate 
trade by creating long-term relationships between the importers and producers, and offering 
services to the producers. Examples of such services may be information about consumer 
tastes in foreign markets, non-tariff trade barriers, import regulations, and the like. Raynolds 
(2002) emphasizes how Fairtrade by working directly with producers helps build local 
capacities. 
 The predominantly critical literature on Fairtrade on the other hand usually claims that 
Fairtrade does not address the fundamental problems, and that its main effect is instead to 
create new market distortions. For example, the most important reason that coffee prices have 
been very low, is overproduction.26 One reason for this may be that coffee is one of the 
products that do not face trade barriers like duties and subsidies in the North.27 Removing 
such trade barriers in the North is seen by many as an important strategy for helping poor 
countries.28 The Economist argues that by paying a higher price for coffee, Fairtrade instead 
stimulates more coffee production, which makes the problem even worse.29 While Ian 
Bretman of FLO replies that the poorest coffee producers have little chance of diversifying 
out of coffee production, and that the increased income from Fairtrade can allow them to 
diversify, The Economist emphasizes that Fairtrade in coffee reduces the incentive to 
diversify.30  
In their reply to the Economist, FLO (2006d) claim that the theories of overproduction 
are unfounded, and that farmers are well aware of the risk of relying on only one product. 
                                                 
26 Milford (2004:4). 
27 Milford (2005:1). 
28 See e.g. Stiglitz and Charlton (2005). 
29 The Economist, 7 December 2006: ”Voting with your trolley”.  
30 A related critique comes from Rune Skarstein, but from a different perspective. He claims that contrary to 
common belief, developing countries have a comparative advantage in the production of industrial products, and 
that they should therefore not specialize in agricultural products. This leads him to call Fairtrade in coffee “a 
bear’s service”. (Forskning.no, 25.04.2005). 
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Instead of increasing production (unless to meet specific additional demands), Fairtrade 
farmer groups therefore use the opportunities offered by Fairtrade to invest in developing their 
market knowledge, in building up their export and processing capacity, or in programmes for 
diversifying production.   
 More generally, it seems that distortionary effects between products from the South 
are not really arguments against the idea of Fairtrade as such, but rather that Fairtrade should 
be limited to a few products like coffee. But one could imagine Fairtrade in all products from 
developing countries.31  
 However, the view of Fairtrade as a market distortion stands strong among 
economists. This is because an important aspect of Fairtrade is the guaranteed minimum price, 
higher than the “market” price. Economic theory usually predicts that a minimum price, while 
helping some people, will have adverse side-effects for others. An example is a minimum 
wage. In a competitive environment, theory says that a minimum wage will lead to 
“involuntary unemployment” for some people. In monopsonistic labour markets, this might be 
different, since with a minimum wage the monopsonist can no longer influence the wage 
below this level. A minimum wage might then lead both to higher wages and higher 
employment.32  
However, I will from now on abstract from problems like monopsony, and allow that 
a priori, Fairtrade causes a market distortion, by securing a minimum wage or price above the 
“market” level. In the introduction to their article on Fairtrade, Maseland and de Vaal (2002) 
write that  
 
“One can imagine that the practice of fair trade organisations might lead to market 
distortions that cause adverse effects if one takes on a more broad perspective”. 
(p.252) 
 
In a Heckscher-Ohlin-model for international trade, Fairtrade has the following effects: 
 
“The effects of paying the higher price for the products the poor country exports have 
more or less the same effect as imposing an import quota for this product. Whereas 
under free trade the poor country would start to export the goods which use its 
abundant factor intensively until the price differences between the countries would be 
                                                 
31 See also Rygh (2006). 
32 Adriani and Becchetti (2004:footnote on p.6). 
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completely eliminated, now it can only export until the price in the rich country has 
fallen to the fair trade level. Exports and international trade are thus limited by the fair 
trade program.” (p.259.) 
 
Whether or not the producers are better off, depends on how much trade is reduced, which 
again depends on the price elasticity for the good in question.33 If trade is reduced a lot, a 
higher price per product sold might not compensate for the reduction in the number of 
products sold, and the producers might be worse off with fair trade.  
 A problem with this argument is that it assumes that Fairtrade is only a cost for the 
consumer, and that Fairtrade products provide no additional value. A different view, stressed 
by Becchetti and Rosati (2005:5-6), is that Fairtrade instead means creating a new market 
where consumers with preferences for fairness can buy “fair” products. To answer these 
questions, we must look closer at the consumer side in Fairtrade. This is done in the next 
chapter.
                                                 
33 Maseland and de Vaal (2002:259). 
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3   Fair consumers and economic modelling 
 
Fairtrade is part of a wider phenomenon known as ethical-political consumption, and which 
has been growing in importance the last decades. In section 3.1 I give a short introduction to 
ethical-political consumption, and in section 3.2 an introduction to the related phenomena of 
ethical investment and corporate social responsibility. The treatment here will, however, 
necessarily be superficial.34  
 Many are sceptical of the merits of ethical consumption. In section 3.3 I discuss some 
criticisms. A suggested alternative, international legislation, is discussed briefly in section 3.4. 
In section 3.5 I discuss the economic modelling of consumer preferences for Fairtrade. This 
discussion serves both to evaluate some criticisms of Fairtrade presented in chapter 2, and to 
prepare the modelling in chapter 5. Finally, in section 3.6 I discuss the argument that 
concerned consumers could instead give money to the producers as direct aid. 
 
3.1   Ethical-political consumption 
A definition of ethical-political consumption, is the purchase, use or disposal of goods as an 
expression of an ethical-political stance (Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen 2006:13). 
An example of ethical-political purchases of goods is Fairtrade. Repairing old clothes instead 
of throwing them away can be an expression of concern for the environment, as is disposing 
of products by recycling them.35 A well-known important type of ethical-political 
consumption is ecological consumption. This may also be due to concerns about health.36 
Often Fairtrade products are also certified ecological.37 
It is useful to distinguish between negative and positive ethical-political consumption. 
Negative ethical-political consumption means choosing away products, like in traditional 
boycotts. Positive ethical-political consumption means that one actively chooses some 
products to buy. This has also been called “buycotts”.38 An important consideration is 
consumers’ choice. Even if there is no “positive” alternative available, a consumer can in 
                                                 
34 For a more complete treatment, see e.g. Føllesdal (2004) and Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen 
(2006), and Barnett, Cafaro and Newholm (2005). 
35 Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen (2006:13). 
36 Reynaud (2004:47). 
37 The certification for the ecological part of the product is done by other organizations. In Norway, this is done 
by Debio (Fairtrade Max Havelaar Norge 2007).  
38 Berg and Terragni (2006:9). 
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principle boycott any product which he or she finds immoral. Conversely, buycotts imply 
choosing away other products.  
 Føllesdal (2004:5-10) lists some main motivations for ethical-political consumers.39 
One is the clean hands-motive, which means that one wants to disentangle oneself morally 
from certain actions. Boycott has traditionally been used in this respect. For example, one 
may wish to avoid buying products made with the use of child labour. A second type of 
motives has to do with personal identity. Ethical-political consumption then becomes an 
expression of one’s values, or of “mutual respect”. Even if an act of ethical-political 
consumption is not able to achieve changes e.g. in firms’ practices, a “symbolic” action may 
still have an expressive purpose. (Føllesdal 2004:7).  
The third main type is instrumental motivations. In this case, consumer actions are 
meant to achieve some change. Ethical-political consumerism has arisen among other things 
as a response to the challenges of globalisation. Føllesdal (2004) discusses this from the 
perspective of political participation. As he writes, 
 
 “Traditionally, political participation has involved the relationship between 
 citizens and their government, which in turn regulates the market. Political 
 consumerism adds to this conception in that citizens turn directly to the market   
with a variety of political concerns.” (Føllesdal 2004:4). 
 
One aim of ethical-political consumerism might be to reform business practices. I here 
emphasize that actions may be seen as supplementary to government action. They might be a 
permanent supplement to governments’ power, or one may use extra-parliamentary means to 
get stricter government and intergovernmental regulation of business. Political consumerism 
might also be a more temporary measure while one waits for global regulation with sufficient 
enforcement power.40  
 I will from now on refer to “ethical consumption” for short. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 My presentation is based also on Jacobsen (2006). 
40 Føllesdal (2004:8). Adriani and Becchetti (2004:1) see Fairtrade from this perspective. For them, Fairtrade is a 
“bottom-up” welfare-improving mechanism, where fair consumers step in to address market imperfections such 
as monopsony, in the absence of a global social planner. 
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3.2 Ethical investment and CSR 
Related to ethical consumption are ethical investment and so-called corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).41 Ethical investment means that investors have ethical criteria for their 
investments in companies.42 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund (a continuation of the 
former Petroleum Fund) has ethical guidelines for its investments, and recently decided to 
withdraw its funds from among others the American company Wal-Mart, due to the 
company’s alleged bad practice with respect to among other things worker rights.43 According 
to the Social Investment Forum (2005:iv), today almost one out of ten dollars invested 
professionally in the United States is involved in socially responsible investment. Ethical 
investment can also mean exercising shareholder power. As Hertz (2006) writes, more and 
more shareholders in companies now not only accept social responsibility, but demand it. One 
important reason is that social responsibility is becoming profitable.44 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the view that firms, rather than just 
maximizing profits, have a responsibility to take into consideration the effects of their actions 
on e.g. workers and the environment. As Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen (2006:19) 
point out, some responsibilitites are already institutionalized through legislation. In addition, 
many firms make their own codes of conduct, guidelines for the responsibilities beyond 
existing legislation, for example in connection with the environment, corruption, ethics, and 
conditions for their workers. It is these codes of conduct, and the systems of implementing 
and reporting them, we normally combine with CSR. CSR is often expressed through the idea 
of a “three-part” bottom line, where firms in addition to their “economic” activity, are 
expected to report about environmental and societal concerns. The impact on society and the 
environment is often represented in so-called social and environmental accounting, firms’ 
own reports about these concerns.45 
Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen (2006:20) identify three main motives for 
CSR. First, it might contribute to protect the firms from reputational risk in generic markets  
( “blame management”). The idea is that in some industries, firms face a low general level of 
consumer trust about their social responsibility. This general consumer trust might be seen as 
                                                 
41 There is also ethical banking, represented in Norway by e.g. Cultura Sparebank which has ethical criteria for 
its loans. 
42 In fact, ethical investment is not new, but originated with the Quakers who wanted to avoid investing in 
products which went against their beliefs. See Ferone (2004). 
43 Dagbladet, 07.06.2006. See Norges Bank (2004) for the ethical guidelines. The current Norwegian 
government is also working on guidelines for state-owned firms. See Aftenposten, morgen, 08.12.2006, p. 5. 
44 Becchetti and Fucito (2000) find that socially “screened” investment portfolios do not give lower returns than 
global portfolios.  
45 See also Adams and Zutshi (2005).   
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a public good for firms. However, some firms may want to privatize consumer trust by 
differentiating themselves from their competitors, and making their particular brand appear 
more socially responsible. However, this also means a privatization of risk. If the firm is 
caught treating its workers badly, its particular brand will be attacked. 
CSR might also contribute to market differentiation by building brand value, which 
again allows the firms to charge a higher price. Finally, CSR might simply be a way to 
achieve ethical actions, and might also help motivate employees.46  
 
3.3 Criticism of ethical consumption and CSR 
For different reasons, people are critical of ethical consumption and CSR. A first critique 
concerns unintended and harmful side-effects. For instance, boycotting a product made using 
child labour will often mean that the children instead end up in the street.47 Snoen (2004:135) 
notes that organizations like UNICEF and Save the Children normally do not support boycott 
as a means for fighting child labour, since the alternative for the children will usually be 
worse. 
Many are also sceptical of the effectiveness of ethical consumption.48 Runar Døving 
considers fair trade to have little opportunities at a lower level than the EU.49 Eriksen and 
Tretvoll (2006) think that ethical consumption leaves too much to consumers’ conscience. 
The same scepticism concerns what can be achieved by firms’ voluntary CSR.50 One 
important problem is that it is often difficult to verify that the firms in fact respect their own 
voluntary guidelines, and the chances for the firms of being caught are small.51  
 Others criticise CSR for interfering with market principles. This view is often 
summarized by the famous statement by Milton Friedman that “the business of business is 
business”.52 Henderson (2001) is concerned among other things that CSR will lead to reduced 
                                                 
46 In the context of environmental protection, Reynaud (2004) identifies three strategies for firms facing 
concerned consumers. The first group of firms, finding protecting the environment costly and perceiving the 
market as less sensible to environmental concerns, have a strategy of “wait and see”. The second group, on the 
other hand, anticipates a growing concern among consumers. For this group, protecting the environment 
becomes a commercial argument. The third group of firms are pro-active, and seek both to influence consumers 
that until now have been less sensible to the environment, and to get environmental protection on their own 
terms. 
47 See Føllesdal (2004), Snoen (2004) and Adriani and Becchetti (2004). 
48 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, pp. 51-55, and The Economist 7 December 2006. 
49 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 53. 
50 See e.g. Doane (2005). 
51 Gaarder (2004:104). See also Adams and Zutshi (2005). 
52 Friedman’s (1975) argument mainly considers the board of the firm, notably that they should not spend the 
shareholders’ money on social responsibility.  
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economic performance and hence reduced welfare for society as a whole.53 Yet other 
problems with ethical consumption and CSR are of course that there might be disagreement as 
to what is in fact “ethical”. As Dickinson and Carsky (2005:25) point out, boycotts have been 
used both to harm and to support the state of Israel.54 Finally, a problem is what we would call 
“unethical” consumption, based e.g. on racism. 
 
3.4 Ethical consumption and CSR versus legislation  
The limitations of consumer voting and CSR are one reason that in response to the problems 
under globalisation, many instead turn to international legislation. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) today has standards for working conditions, but no effective means of 
enforcing them.55 However, possibilities of enforcement exist in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).56 Many therefore want standards for labour and the environment in the 
WTO. However, developing countries themselves oppose such standards, as they fear that 
standards will just be hidden protectionism by developed countries.57 Respecting standards 
might also lead to higher production costs for the developing countries, and therefore reduce 
their competitiveness, which could lead to reduced trade. Though some workers will have 
better working conditions, if trade is reduced a lot, the overall welfare effects of international 
standards for workers in the South could be ambiguous.58  
  
3.5 Economic modelling of preferences for Fairtrade 
We now look at how to model consumer preferences for Fairtrade. First, we establish what 
seem to be the most important empirical characteristics of such preferences. Becchetti and 
Rosati (2005) find that the revealed preferences of many consumers show that they are willing 
to pay in excess of the market price for the social features of Fairtrade products.  
I said in the introduction that it does not seem relevant to model Fairtrade using 
exclusively self-interested consumers, so we need to include some notion of preferences 
concerning other agents. Fehr and Fischbacher (2002:C2) define social preferences in the 
following way: 
                                                 
53 See Henderson (2001:15-8). 
54 See Fershtman and Gandal (1998) for a discussion of the economic effects of the Arab boycott of Israel in the 
automobile market. 
55 See Goel (2005:49-53) for a presentation of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work. 
56 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 55, Eriksen and Tretvoll (2006). See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), 
chapter 3 for a discussion of the enforcement of rules in the WTO. 
57 Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 55. 
58 Note that this argument is similar to the one of Maseland and de Vaal (2002). 
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 “A person exhibits social preferences if the person not only cares about the 
 material resources allocated to her but also cares about the material resources 
 allocated to relevant reference agents.” 
 
One of the first to include social preferences in an economic model, seems to have been Sen 
(1966), who let the members of a worker co-operative have preferences for the welfare of the 
other members. One important strand of economic research on social preferences started with 
Akerlof’s work on labour contracts as a partial gift-exchange.59 Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002:C2) point out that in the last 15 years there has been a large number of studies 
indicating that in addition to material self-interest, social preferences shape the decisions of a 
substantial fraction of people. The three most important types of social preferences are the 
following: Reciprocity refers to the desire among people of repaying kindness with kindness, 
and unkindness with unkindness (Nyborg 2006c). Inequity aversion means that the agents 
dislike inequality.60 Pure altruism means kindness that is not conditional on kindness 
received. Technically, altruism means that an agent values the material resources allocated to 
relevant reference agents positively (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002:C4).  
 To delimit the concept of social preferences to make it suitable for Fairtrade, I follow 
Becchetti and Rosati (2005), who extend the concept of relevant reference agents to include 
also workers in developing countries. As they write, 
 
“(…) global market integration has led to a compression of distances and to an 
enlargement of the potential reference group considered when social preferences are 
formulated. (…) We argue that the progressive integration and reduction of virtual 
distances leads a share of “concerned” consumers to care about distant people, 
integrating them in the set of their relevant reference agents.” (Becchetti and Rosati 
2005:3) 
 
As I will now show, how one models these social preferences is important. In section 2.5 I 
argued that Maseland and de Vaal’s (2002) analysis rests on dubious assumptions about the 
consumer side in Fairtrade. As Maseland and de Vaal see it, Fairtrade is a question of duty, 
which corresponds to an absolute constraint on the actions the consumer may take: 
                                                 
59 See Becchetti and Rosati (2005). 
60 Becchetti and Rosati (2005) use this concept in connection with preferences for Fairtrade. 
24 
  
 
 “ ‘Fair trade’ in this paper refers to the consumer movement that has come up in 
several Western countries in the past decades, in which people feel morally obliged to 
pay prices above market level for products produced under certain conditions in Third 
World countries. Crucial in this practice is that restricting oneself to goods produced 
under these conditions and paying higher prices are both considered to be moral 
obligations rather than preferences (…) The fact that fair-trading is a moral obligation 
means that there is no trade-off possible between these principles and consumer 
preferences (…) Such principles can be seen as ‘ideological constraints’ analogous to 
a budget constraint; preferences have to be weighed within such constraints, which are 
themselves not part of the utility function”. (p.252-3). 
 
This formulation can explain the fact that consumers buy fair products for a higher price, and 
it also has some intuitive appeal. However, I now argue that the “ideological constraint” 
formulation of preferences for Fairtrade is problematic. There are two reasons for this. First, I 
think few consumers see Fairtrade as an absolute duty, overriding all other concerns, such as 
price and quality. Second, because fairness is not included in the utility function itself, but is 
modelled as a constraint on utility maximization, Maseland and de Vaal’s formulation 
excludes the possibility that consumers derive value from the fact that a good is fair.  
 To see more clearly what this means, consider a consumer who would have three cups 
of coffee a day if he paid the “market” price for the coffee. However, the consumer feels 
morally obliged to pay a “fair” price for the coffee. Since Fairtrade coffee is just the same 
thing as ordinary coffee, he will reduce his consumption of coffee following his price 
elasticity. This could e.g. mean that he will have only two cups of “fair” coffee. However, if 
the fact that the coffee is fair provides additional value, he might not reduce his consumption 
much. In other words: a price increase due to the fairness of a product is perhaps not the 
same as any other price increase.61 
This can be shown more clearly by the following division of the values that consumers 
derive from a good. 
 
1. “Self-interested” values. These are the values that a consumer would care about if he 
had no social preferences. These include taste, quality etc. 
                                                 
61 This idea will also be important when I discuss international standards below. 
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2. “Social” values.62 These include whether a good is produced under decent working 
conditions, whether production is environmentally sustainable, and whether the 
producers receive a decent price. 
 
In Maseland and de Vaal (2002), there are only self-interested values for the consumer, in the 
sense that only these give the consumer utility, while the “social” values enter only as 
constraints on utility maximization. We must then also conclude that the consumer would 
have had a higher utility if he was not constrained by moral considerations. This implicit 
assumption that Fairtrade is just a cost for the consumer, and gives him or her no value, 
underlies much of the criticism of Fairtrade. However, it might represent a too narrow view of 
consumers’ motivations. Peter Singer (2006) puts this in the following way:63 
 
“If people want to pay $ 48 for a pound (0.45 kg) of Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee 
because that’s what James Bond prefers, economists don’t object that the market is 
being distorted. So why be critical when consumers choose to pay $ 12 for a pound of 
coffee that they know has been grown without toxic chemicals, under shade trees that 
help birds to survive, by farmers who can now afford to feed and educate their 
children?” 
 
The fact that many consumers derive additional value from the “fair” characteristics of 
Fairtrade products can be represented by an altruistic preference formulation.64 In such a 
formulation, consumers have preferences over the quantity of the good, but also over the 
welfare of South workers.65 This is the “classical altruism” formulation (Nyborg 2006a): 
 
                                                 
62 These could also include “antisocial” values. See Bojer (2003:32-4) for a discussion of antisocial preferences. 
However, I here disregard this possibility. Note also that environmental-friendly production here does not imply 
traditional externalities. The consumer might care about environmental-friendly production in distant countries 
even if his or her own consumption is not affected.  
63 The Japan Times, Sunday, April 23, 2006. 
64 If one insists that Fairtrade “in reality” means a cost to the consumer, one might defend the use of an altruistic 
preference function by invoking an “as-if” argument. One could then argue that even if Fairtrade “in reality” 
means a cost to the consumer, an altruistic preference function where things are “as if” the consumer derived 
additional value, is better suited for modelling, because its predictions might fit better with what we observe. For 
more on “as-if” arguments and the debate surrounding them in economics, see Nordberg and Røgeberg (2003), 
Torsvik (2005) and Hanisch (2003). Note also that I have rejected an “as-if” argument with purely self-interested 
agents. 
65 Becchetti and Solferino (2004) use a Hotelling model of product differentiation, reinterpreting distance as the 
“ethical distance” of a product from the consumer’s ethical standards. Other things equal, the longer this 
distance, the lower his or her utility. 
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 ( , )i i iU U X U−=        (3.1) 
 
iX is agent i’s consumption of the good, and iU−  is the outcome for South producers. Unlike 
the “ideological constraint” formulation, this formulation allows for both self-interested and 
social values.66  
However, also this model has some short-comings. Nyborg (2006a) points out that 
research on contributions to public goods, has shown that this type of altruism cannot explain 
the level of voluntary contributions. This is because even if people care about their own and 
other people’s access to the public good, they would like other people to pay for it. This 
means that we have a “free-rider” problem. However, agents may also have preferences for 
contributing to the public good themselves. According to the “impure altruism” theory, 
contributing oneself creates a “warm glow of giving”, which may be seen as a private good.67 
The impure altruism model has been used to analyze the demand e.g. for eco-labeled goods 
and recycling (Nyborg 2006a).  
We can make a similar argument for Fairtrade. As Hausman and McPherson (1996:63) 
point out, people may prefer a high level of consumption for the poor, but if they have no 
preferences for the process, they prefer other people to pay for it.68 However, if people have 
preferences for contributing themselves, the free-rider problem goes away. 
The discussion in this section is summed up with the following “impurely altruistic” 
utility function, adapted from Nyborg (2006a): 
 
( , , )i i i iU W X U P−=        (3.2) 
 
iX is agent i’s consumption of the good, iU−  is the outcome for South producers, and iP  is 
agent i’s own purchase of Fairtrade goods. Importantly, different consumers might have 
different preferences over these concerns. In the analysis in chapter 5, I simplify by 
disregarding the argument iU− . This may be justified by the fact that each consumer’s 
contribution to the overall outcome is in any case negligible. 
                                                 
66 Of course, there is nothing in the way of combining the two approaches. One could e.g. postulate a minimum 
ethical requirement below which the consumer will not go in any case (i.e. an absolute constraint), while 
allowing for altruistic preferences for ethics above this minimum level. 
67 The private good provided by one’s own contributions might be the consumers’ self-image as a socially 
responsible person, or social approval from others. The concept of self-image might be related to what Føllesdal 
(2004:7) calls arguments of identity. The role of social approval is discussed by Nyborg (2006). However, I will 
not pursue these interpretations further here. 
68 Jon Vislie aptly called this ”opportunistic altruism”. 
27 
  
 
3.6 Fairtrade versus direct aid  
After having discussed consumer preferences for Fairtrade, it seems suitable to discuss the 
argument that Fairtrade is an inefficient way for consumers to satisfy their social preferences. 
The Economist claims that retailers add large mark-ups to Fairtrade products and mislead 
consumers into thinking that all the premium they are paying is passed on to the producers. 
According to Harford (2005), only 10% of the premium paid for Fairtrade coffee reaches the 
producer.69 Instead of buying fair trade products, the consumers could just give the money 
directly to the producers in the South as aid.  
If it is indeed the case that most of the Fairtrade premium does not go to poor 
producers, the legitimacy of the system is in danger. However, in my view this is not really an 
argument against the idea of Fairtrade. It is better seen as an information problem where 
retailers exploit private information to extract a rent from ethical consumers. 
 Besides this, it has been argued that Fairtrade has some advantages compared to direct 
aid. Becchetti and Rosati (2005: footnote on p.7) mention some possible advantages. First, as 
we saw in section 2.5, Fairtrade may increase competition in labour, credit and product 
markets. It might also facilitate trade and provide other important services to the producers. 
These effects are absent with aid. In addition, Becchetti and Rosati point among other things 
to the fact that charity does not necessarily reward productiveness; that joining consumption 
and social transfer reduces transaction costs of aid to the poor compared to the traditional tax 
financed government aid scheme; and that the Fairtrade “bottom-up” mechanism might be 
more efficient than subsidies to the government in targeting the poor. This last point is 
relevant if one is concerned that aid often disappears in corruption in poor countries. Also, fair 
trade has the effect of triggering socially responsible imitation among traditional, profit-
maximizing producers.70 Also this “ethical benchmarking” effect is absent with traditional 
aid. Finally, in the debate on trade versus development aid, it is often argued that trade gives 
more dignity for the producers than just receiving aid. Fairtrade must then also give more 
dignity than just receiving aid.71  
 
 
                                                 
69 The Economist 7 December 2006. Tucker (2006) also mentions such allegations. 
70 See also Becchetti and Solferino (2004). 
71 See however Vramo (2006) for an interesting discussion of the Western dichotomy between trade and aid 
(“gifts”). 
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4 Market failures in the provision of fair goods 
 
In chapter 4, I ask the following question: Is a private market able to sufficiently 
accommodate social preferences for Fairtrade? As is discussed in section 4.1, one crucial 
assumption for the competitive model in economics is information. In sections 4.2 – 4.4 I 
argue that there are market failures in the provision of information about the ethical features 
of goods. The problem essentially arises from firms’ private information about the fairness of 
production, and the fact that it is usually too costly for the ethical consumer to search such 
information. In section 4.5 I discuss the main argument against the theory, namely the 
development of private labelling schemes like Fairtrade. Finally, in section 4.6 I briefly 
discuss some other costs of ethical consumption.  
 
4.1 Information about the ethical characteristics of goods 
At least since the famous article by Akerlof on the market for “lemons”, the role of 
information has been seen as crucial in economics.72 Ethical consumption is no exception. In 
order for ethical consumers to be able to satisfy their altruistic preferences, they need 
information about the production process, with regard to working conditions, impact on the 
environment, and the like. Ethical information is in many ways a particular form of 
information, as it often concerns not primarily the characteristics of the product as such.73 In 
addition, while a consumer will usually find out sooner or later whether the car he bought was 
a “lemon”, he will perhaps never know the truth about the conditions for workers in the 
production of the good he bought.  
 
4.2 Ethical risk  
Suppose an ethical consumer is considering buying a pair of jeans labelled ”Made in China”. 
He or she might have read in the newspaper about the bad conditions for workers in a clothes 
                                                 
72 Akerlof (1984), chapter 2. 
73 Important exceptions are e.g. ecological consumption and food produced using genetically modified organisms 
(GMO). More generally, one can say that economic theory usually has seen this type of information as irrelevant 
for consumers, and even normatively something consumers should not be concerned about (see Vramo 2006:12-
3). On the other hand, Per Persson says that Fairtrade also means buying the history of a product. 
(Verdensmagasinet X, nr. 6 2006, p. 44). Lancaster (1966:133) argues that we should break away from the 
traditional approach of seeing goods themselves as the direct objects of utility, and instead suppose that it is the 
“properties” or “characteristics” of the goods from which utility is derived. Among such characteristics might be 
the “history” of the product. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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factory in China. The consumer is now concerned that these jeans might have been produced 
under similar conditions. This uncertainty about the fairness of production, which reduces the 
ethical consumer’s utility of the good, might be called ethical risk. Recent surveys indicate 
that a non-negligible number of consumers experience such ethical risk. In October 2006, 
Opinion conducted a survey for NORAD on Norwegian consumers’ attitudes towards 
products from the South. 45 percent of the respondents said they felt guilty because they 
bought products they were not sure held a certain ethical standard.  
At the same time, 85 percent of the respondents agreed that trade with developing 
countries contributes to development, and they therefore wished to buy more products from 
developing countries.74 When 51 percent also think that the risk of bad working conditions is 
a reason not to buy products from developing countries, it seems that consumers are often 
unsure whether buying products from the South in fact contributes to development.75 This is 
another way of looking at ethical risk. 
 To avoid ethical risk, the ethical consumer has two strategies: Either search ethical 
information, or buy goods that he or she for different reasons trusts are “fair”.  
 
4.3 Consumer strategy 1: Search for ethical information 
It is now possible to find more and more ethical information. For example, there are many 
specialist internet sites and magazines providing consumers with such information.76 Many of 
these are run by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the individual consumer 
needs to put in a lot of effort to find and make use of this information. Eidi Ann Hansen, 
editor of the Norwegian internet portal for ethical consumption, Etiskforbruk.no, noted that 
when she now has an overview of what it is okay to buy, and what one should avoid, this is 
only because she has been able to use several work days in searching for the right 
information.77 These search costs are an additional cost of ethical consumption, over and 
above the isolated “fair” price. Probably for most consumers, the costs of searching for ethical 
information for use in everyday shopping, are near prohibitive.78 
Another concern is the quality and independence of the information. As noted in 
section 3.2 above, firms publish reports about their activities in relation to social goals and the 
                                                 
74 Opinion (2006:3). 
75 Opinion (2006:13). 
76 In appendix B I give some examples of important sources of ethical information. 
77 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 55. 
78 In addition, as Sigbjørn Hjelmbrekke pointed out to me, firms often have shares in other firms, who might 
have unfair production, or have shares in other firms again, etc. making it virtually impossible to keep track of 
the ethics. 
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environment. However, since such information is hard to verify, the consumer might be 
sceptical about the firms’ own claims to fairness. Some authors are also sceptical of NGOs’ 
important role as providers of information. As Føllesdal (2004:17) notes, quality control is a 
challenge even for the most well-intentioned NGOs. Also the lack of quality-control of the 
myriad sources for ethical information on the Internet is a problem. 
 
4.4 Consumer strategy 2: Buy “safe” products 
A possible consequence of the costs of finding reliable ethical information is that the 
consumer might turn to another strategy of reducing ethical risk, namely buying “safe” 
products. As mentioned, for many types of products there does not exist a Fairtrade 
alternative. In this case consumers might choose to buy products produced in the North 
countries rather than in the South, for example due to labour legislation in the North that they 
trust is effective.79 
This means that ethical risk could theoretically represent a problem not just for 
concerned North consumers, but also for the South, if it reduces trade. The practical 
importance of this is unclear. Still, in the survey by Opinion, 85 percent of consumers claimed 
that they would to a larger degree buy products from the South if they were labelled “fair 
trade”. 64 percent of consumers also declared a willingness to pay a higher price for a 
guarantee that products have been produced in a fair manner.80 This indicates that the removal 
of ethical risk could mean that more consumers would buy products from the South. 
 
4.5 Ethical product labelling: a public good?  
Consider now that if the relevant ethical information can be summarized in a simple “ethical” 
label on the product, the information is costlessly available to all consumers. This means that 
ethical labelling seems to have the characteristics of a public good in the economic-theoretical 
sense.81 A public good is a good with the following characteristics: There are large fixed costs 
in connection with producing the good, but when it is first produced, the costs of allowing one 
additional consumer access to the good is negligible. The theory of public goods then suggests 
that each individual will hope to free-ride on the others by letting them incurring the costs of 
providing the public good. Even if the consumer has quite strong altruistic preferences, the 
                                                 
79 In fact, there is a third strategy. In the face of overwhelming amounts of ethical information, the consumer 
may instead turn to his or her social networks for information about what to do. See Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø 
and Torjusen (2006:27). Also, NGOs have an important role in coordinating consumers in boycotts. See Innes 
(2006). However, I will not discuss this further here. 
80 Opinion (2006:25). 
81 See Varian (1992), chapter 23 for a discussion of public goods. 
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costs of searching ethical information might be too high. This could suggest that a private 
market will lead to a too low provision of ethical information, which means that a priori the 
authorities might have a role to play.82  
 
4.6 Can private labelling schemes provide sufficient fair labelling? 
However, the above theory immediately meets the objection that there today exist many 
different “fair” labels. Some of these are by independent, non-profit labelling schemes like 
Fairtrade. In economic theory, these schemes could be represented by a non-profit, altruistic 
agent willing to incur the fixed costs of providing the label. In addition, many firms today 
have their own “fair” brands. Does this mean that a private market, due to altruistic agents, 
after all is able to provide an “efficient” supply of fair goods? 
 My main objection is that there exist Fairtrade alternatives only for certain products, 
mostly primary commodities like coffee and bananas. For many other types of products from 
the South, there is no fair alternative. Fairtrade labelling of clothing, for example, only 
concerns the production of the cotton, and not the rest of the production chain.83 As Engler 
(2006) notes, even if the cotton is Fairtrade, there is no guarantee that workers are not being 
exploited at the other steps of the production process. The fact that there exists Fairtrade 
labelling for some products from poor countries, but not other products, might be important. 
One might think of at least two explanations for this.  
 First, one might argue that there is less need for fair labels in other types of goods than 
primary products. Possibly, some characteristics of primary products make the producers 
especially vulnerable. For example, in section 2.4 it was argued that characteristics of 
agricultural products make the producers’ income more volatile. Another possible argument is 
that as developing countries now move up the product cycle, there is an increasing content of 
knowledge in production.84 This will increase workers’ bargaining power and make them less 
vulnerable to exploitation. Hence, there might be less need for Fairtrade. 
 However, as we have seen also in the textile industry there have been many reports of 
bad conditions.85 Further, a knowledge-intensive product like a mobile phone might be the 
result of a series of less knowledge-intensive operations, where workers continue to have low 
                                                 
82 A problem in practice is of course what information should be included on ethical product labels, among other 
things what level of detail the information should have. For example, behind the Fairtrade label lie detailed 
standards that are different from product to product. Probably few Fairtrade consumers consult these standards, 
and they instead trust the label and the text on the product. I here disregard this problem.  
83 Engler (2006), Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 51. 
84 A good example is the rapidly growing information technology sector in India. 
85 See e.g. Klein (2000), Ransom (2001) and Gaarder (2004). 
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bargaining power. A couple of years ago, for example, mobile phone company NOKIA was 
accused of exploitative conditions in its factories in Asia, where workers assemble mobile 
phones.86 Ransom (2001:26-7) describes the bad conditions in a TV factory in Mexico. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that there is necessarily less need for Fairtrade in other 
products than primary products. The important division seems instead to be between skilled 
and unskilled labour, as is emphasized by Adriani and Becchetti (2004:1).  
 To me, a more plausible explanation for the fact that there is fair labelling of some 
products, but not others, is that there are differences between products in how easy it is to 
establish fair labelling. It might require fewer resources to label simple products like coffee, 
than products like clothes that have a more complex and less transparent production process.87 
The different parts of production here happen in totally different places, if not totally different 
countries. Ragnhild Hammer of Fairtrade Max Havelaar Norge says that since the production 
of Fairtrade cotton is still low in volume, they have a reasonable overview of where the cotton 
goes later.88 But if the volume were to become large, controlling this may require a lot of 
resources. The problem might be even greater for more complex products like mobile phones. 
An important characteristic of globalisation is exactly the splitting up and outsourcing of 
production to various countries.89 Simon Pahle at the university of Ås also argues that the 
shorter the delivery chain, the larger is the possibility that pressure from consumers will have 
an effect.90  
 Some factors however pull in the opposite direction of what I have said above. For 
example, in the case of clothes, the ethics in the rest of the production chain could be 
maintained through other labels of certification.91 However, there have been some problems 
with quality control for such standards.92 It might also be easier to ensure fair production 
within the walls of a factory. But as Gaarder (2004) points out, e.g. in the textile industry the 
trend today is for firms to have fewer people employed in factories, and instead putting out 
work to home-workers.93  
                                                 
86 svt.se (2005).  
87 See Ransom (2001:97). 
88 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 51. 
89 A good example (though perhaps not the most relevant in the context of Fairtrade) is cars. According to Box 
2.4 in St. Meld. nr. 19 (2002-2003), the production of a certain car by a large American car producer is based on 
contributions from no less than nine countries.  
90 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 55. 
91 Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. desember 2006, p. 51. Some important standards are discussed in Goel (2005).  
92 Gaarder (2004:108-10). 
93 Gaarder (2004:64-71). 
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 As mentioned, many firms today have their own fair brands. However, there have been 
examples that production in fact was not quite “fair”.94 Crane (2005) notes that there seems to 
be scepticism among consumers about the fairness of many such brands.95  
Though there is obviously need for more research on this, I think the argument that 
ethical labelling has the characteristics of a public good is reasonable. However, a 
particularity about this public good is that is also has consequences for people in the South, 
which need to be taken into consideration in public policy. 
 
4.7 Other costs of ethical consumption  
Though it seems reasonable to claim that searching ethical information is an important cost 
for ethical consumers, such costs cannot explain why the share of Fairtrade coffee only makes 
up 1.5 percent of the total sales of coffee in Norway. If one is not ready to accept that this 
means that most consumers in fact do not care about the fairness of production, part of the 
explanation for the low Fairtrade share might be that searching ethical information is not the 
only extra cost associated with fair consumption. I end chapter 4 by briefly discussing some 
other costs of ethical consumption. The discussion is to a large extent based the situation in 
Norway. 
 One important additional cost for the consumer is the lower product range.96 Though 
one can find Fairtrade coffee in most shops in Norway, there is usually only one type, while 
there are many types of “ordinary” coffee. The problem of lower product range is however 
smaller in other countries like France and the UK. This might be part of the explanation why 
the Fairtrade share of the coffee market is 20 percent in the UK. “Fair trade” products have 
traditionally also been associated with lower quality. This impression lives on today e.g. in the 
mentioned article by The Economist, who write that coffee drinkers find the quality of 
Fairtrade brews to vary widely.97 However, it is not my impression that most coffee drinkers 
find the quality of Fairtrade coffee inferior. 
 Another important cost for consumers buying fair products used to be that one might 
have to travel far to find a specialized shop with the products. This cost is now much less 
important, as most supermarkets today have Fairtrade products. However, many supermarkets 
                                                 
94 However, neither the Fairtrade schemes are free of such problems. I return to this in chapter 6. 
95 As Terragni, Jacobsen, Vittersø and Torjusen (2006:27) point out, the proliferation of labels might end up 
confusing the consumers, who might not be able to tell the difference between official labels that are certified 
according to approved standards, and “quasi-labels” for which there are no independent systems of certification. 
96 See also Becchetti and Rosati (2005). 
97 The Economist 7 December 2006. 
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still have only some of the products, and some of the largest chains currently have only 
Fairtrade coffee in many of their outlets.98 
 Finally, but not least importantly, Fairtrade products have to compete about the 
consumers’ attention with many well-established brands. With limited marketing resources, 
this might also be an explanation for the low share of Fairtrade products. In addition, Fairtrade 
products have, like ecological products, often been placed in less visibly in the shops. 
However, when they are fronted by the shops, results improve (Berg and Terragni 2006:13). 
 Some of the additional costs of Fairtrade might be falling in the number of buyers of 
Fairtrade products. One example is the costs of distribution. If there are few consumers, costs 
might be high, and only the most concerned consumers will buy Fairtrade. However, if many 
consumers buy the products, the cost per product might be much lower. This may mean that 
one needs a critical mass of Fairtrade consumers to be able to have Fairtrade on a larger scale. 
Public policy could here perhaps help by coordinating agents. 
                                                 
98 An overview of the distribution of current Fairtrade products in Norway on the supermarket chains is given in 
Appendix D. 
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5 Public policy  
 
In chapter 5, I assume that the theory of ethical labelling as a public good in chapter 4 is 
correct. For simplicity, I assume that the costs of searching ethical information are 
prohibitive. This means that without ethical labelling, consumers have no way of knowing 
whether a good (e.g. a pair of jeans) from the South is fair or not. I then set up a model 
framework to study the welfare effects in the North and the South of different public policies. 
The first, which I call Public policy 1, is ethical labelling of all goods from the South. The 
second, Public policy 2, is ensuring a fair South alternative. The third, Public policy 3, is 
international standards. I also briefly discuss a Public policy 4, public ethical investment. 
 
5.1 A model framework 
I propose that the effects of different public policies depend on the preferences, ethical 
information and beliefs of North consumers; on the reactions of firms in the South; and on the 
conditions for South individuals. In the following, I present a model framework with weight 
on these three groups of agents. 
 
5.1.1 Individuals in the North 
We look first at consumers in the North. In section 3.5, I argued that a formulation of 
preferences for fair trade should incorporate the following elements. First, the fairness of a 
good should potentially give the consumer additional value. Second, the weight given to 
fairness considerations should vary among individuals. A useful preference formulation which 
allows for this is provided by Adriani and Becchetti (2002, 2004). The consumer framework 
in my model is based on their formulation.99 I first present the general preference framework, 
and then show how one can introduce consumer uncertainty about the fairness of goods. 
Like in Adriani and Becchetti (2004), North consumers consume a single good x, 
which is traded internationally but consumed only in the North. There is a uniformly 
distributed continuum of consumers indexed by the parameter α which takes values between 0 
and 1. Consumers’ welfare is increasing both in the quantity of the good and its fairness. 
However, the relative importance of quantity and fairness differs between individuals. Apart 
                                                 
99 These are two versions of the same article. My exposition of the preference framework is based on the earlier 
version of the article from 2002. 
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from fairness considerations the good is homogenous, i.e. it does not matter for the consumer 
if the good as such is produced in the North or in the South.100 This means that I abstract e.g. 
from differences in quality. The utility function (see Adriani and Becchetti 2002) is  
 
 1( ; ; ; ) ( ) ; (0,1)U q g h gh qα αα α−= ∈       (5.1)  
  
q denotes the quantity consumed of the good. Fairness is measured along two dimensions: 
Whether the good is produced in the North or in the South, and on whether production is 
“fair” or “unfair”. The disutility for the consumers of a good being unfair is measured by the 
qualitative variable g, which takes the value 1 if the good is fair, and ρ < 1 if the good is 
unfair.101 The value of a good being from either the South or the North is measured by the 
qualitative variable h, which takes the value 1 if the product is produced in the North and θ 
(any positive value) if it is produced in the South. If θ is greater than 1, consumers prefer 
South products. This may for example be due to a belief that they are helping poor South 
producers with fewer outside options than North producers. Note that g and h enter 
symmetrically in the fairness of the good. We may call the product gh the Fairtrade variable, 
since it incorporates the two dimensions of Fairtrade: Supporting South producers while 
guaranteeing fair production.  
For most of the time, I will use the assumptions of Adriani and Becchetti (2004:8) that 
θ > 1 and ρθ < 1. This means that although consumers prefer a fair South product, their 
second best choice is a fair North product rather than an unfair South product (for equal 
prices).102 The different weights individual consumers put on quantity and fairness depend on 
the parameter α. Consumers with a low α derive their utility mainly from the quantity 
consumed, while consumers with a high α derive their utility mainly from the fairness of the 
product. 
 
Ethical risk 
While Adriani and Becchetti (2004:8) assume that the origin and fairness of production can be 
costlessly observed by consumers, I introduce uncertainty about the fairness of the goods. 
                                                 
100 Alternatively, one could assume that the South goods are perfect substitutes for some other type of North 
goods. 
101 In this model, fairness refers to an exogenously given “fair” wage. I abstain here from discussing different 
conceptions of fairness, and refer the reader to section 2.4 above. 
102 The case ρθ > 1 is however also interesting. It could e.g. follow from a belief that even though conditions are 
very bad for workers in poor countries, it is after all still better to trade with the South. In fact, in the model here 
the consumers would be right in this. 
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Without fair labelling, consumers cannot know whether a particular good is fair or not. 
However, I assume that consumers are able to use country-of-origin labelling to form a 
probability distribution over the possible outcomes. I simplify by assuming only two possible 
countries of origin, North and South. There are two possible outcomes, fair or unfair. When 
consumers see the label “Made in South”, they expect that the good is fair with probability p 
and unfair with probability (1-p). As is discussed later, this subjective p may or may not be 
accurate.103 For simplicity, I assume that when consumers see the label “Made in North”, they 
feel sure that the good is fair (they assign a probability r = 1 to this outcome). This is due to 
legislation in the North, which consumers trust is effective. The uncertainty in the model is 
therefore over whether the South good is fair or not.  
North consumers’ expected utility functions are given by 
 
 1 1(1 )NEU r q r q
αα α ρ− −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
         
          1q α−=          (5.2)  
 
if they consume the North product,104 and  
 
( )1 1(1 )SEU p q p q αα αα θρθ− −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
           
         1 ( (1 ) )q p p αα α ρθ−= + −         (5.3) 
 
if they consume the South product. Note that since the consumer has no way of knowing 
whether the good he has bought is fair or not, this will also be his or her actual utility from 
consuming the good. In other words, ethical risk reduces the consumers’ utility of the South 
good.  
 A high p means that consumers feel confident that the South good is fair. The ethical 
risk when they buy a South good is then low. A ρ that is close to 1 means that the average 
consumer puts little weight on the fair production dimension of fairness. In this case, p 
matters little. On the other hand, if ρ is close to 0, the average consumer is very unfairness-
                                                 
103 The determinants of p are obviously of interest. Though I do not here model a process for the formation of p, 
some comments on this will be made in the analysis that follows. 
104 Using the assumptions that h = r = g = 1.  
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averse, and will therefore be concerned to avoid buying a good that is unfair. This means that 
he or she will need a high p to buy the South good.  
 Like Adriani and Becchetti (2004:12), I assume that North individuals’ income does 
not depend on whether the good x is produced in the North.105 In my model, each North 
individual can receive the wage wN in some sector of the economy. If the production of x 
changes, the individuals’ labour is (frictionlessly) reallocated to or from other sectors from the 
economy, while total labour demand in the North is always constant, so that an individual will 
always work the same number H of hours. In addition to wage income, North individuals 
receive an equal share π of the profits from North firms. Also profits are assumed to remain 
unchanged with changes in x, as the other sectors adjust their output equivalently. Income for 
a North individual is therefore  
 
 N NW w H π= +         (5.4) 
 
All income is spent on good x, so the budget constraint is  
 
 N
i
Wq
P
=   i = N, S, F, U      (5.5) 
  
The subscript N denotes North, S denotes the South product without fair labelling, F denotes 
the fair South product and U the unfair South product. Like in Adriani and Becchetti 
(2004:10), the indirect utility function for consumer α is 
 
 
1
( ; ; )N
WNU p W PN
α
α
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
       (5.6) 
 
if he consumes the North product, 
 
                                                 
105 This assumption is unrealistic, and has implications for the analysis of welfare in the North. In practice, North 
workers may experience both reduced income and/or costs of retraining after losing their jobs to the South. See 
e.g. Kapstein (2000). Still, the assumption corresponds to the idea that North workers have better outside options 
than South workers. 
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if he consumes the unfair South product, and 
 
 
1
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α
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       (5.8) 
 
if he consumes the fair South product. For equal prices, and given ρθ < 1, all consumers prefer 
a fair South product. Fair goods therefore receive a higher price, i.e.  
 
  FP  > UP         (5.9) 
 
As Adriani and Becchetti (2004:11) note, since the North product is strictly preferred to an 
unfair South product for equal prices, we must have  
 
UP   < NP          (5.10) 
 
As will be justified below, I assume for simplicity, like Adriani and Becchetti (2004), that we 
will have 
 
   PF  = PN          (5.11) 
 
If there is no ethical labelling, the consumer who buys the “Made in South” product has the 
expected indirect utility 
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If p is close to one, the expected indirect utility will be close to that from consuming a fair 
South product.106 If p instead is close to zero, the expected indirect utility will be close to that 
from consuming an unfair South product. For a p closer to the middle of the (0,1) interval, the 
indirect utility will also be somewhere in between. I will usually assume that the “Made in 
South” good receives a price which is somewhere between the prices of the fair and the unfair 
South goods, i.e.  
 
FP   > SP  > UP           (5.13) 
 
Without ethical labelling, there will (normally) be a consumer indifferent between consuming 
the North good and the unlabelled South good. Denote this consumer by αs.107 
 
 αs  s. t. 
1 1
( (1 ) )
S S
SS
W WN Np pP PS N
α α
αα ρθ
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    (5.14) 
 
From this we see that the lower is ρ and/or p, the more consumers will choose to buy the 
North product to avoid ethical risk. Welfare in the North without ethical labelling, denoted by 
NR, is (the superscript R is for “risk”, i.e. ethical risk) 
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α αρθ
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For low α consumers, the quantity consumed of the good is more important than its fairness. 
The first part of the expression is the welfare of consumers that buy ethically risky products 
from the South (up to consumer αs). The second part is the welfare of consumers who buy the 
product from the North (the rest of the (0,1) segment).  
 
5.1.2 Production in the North and in the South 
While I have followed Adriani and Becchetti (2002, 2004) in modelling the consumer side, 
the production side in my model is different. As discussed in section 2.5, Adriani and 
                                                 
106 Interestingly, if p = 1 the fair production component of preferences is “latent”, but does not influence actual 
consumption decisions, since consumers believe that everything is OK. 
107 This consumer is somewhere in the interval (0,1), possibly at one of the endpoints. 
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Becchetti assume that there are two firms, a monopsonist and a fair firm. I here abstract from 
problems of monopsony. As such problems are emphasized by a lot of the earlier work on 
Fairtrade, this is an important limitation. On the other hand, I believe that my set-up is able to 
highlight some other important factors. One of these is the effect of the extent of extra 
willingness to pay for fair production among North consumers. In Adriani and Becchetti 
(2004), the price premium for fair products may never become high enough to induce the 
monopsonist to produce a fair product. The reason is that the constant returns to scale set-up 
used does not allow for positive profits in the long run, so the only way the monopsonist can 
make positive profits is by producing an unfair good. He therefore produces an unfair good, 
except when he is forced to pay the competitive wage to attract any workers at all. In addition, 
in Adriani and Becchetti (2004) the Fairtrade price premium does not affect the size that the 
fair firm may take. However, I here want to study how the size of the fairness premium affects 
the general conditions for fair production. In particular, if the fair price premium is high 
enough, and markets are functioning, I see no reason why all production in the South cannot 
be fair.   
 This leads me to the following model of the production side. First, I use the 
assumption of Adriani and Becchetti (2004:9) that production technologies per se are equal in 
the North and the South.108 I treat North and South production together. To allow for positive 
profits in the long run, I use a technology with decreasing returns to scale. Firms have the 
choice between fair or unfair production. In this model, fairness means paying an exogenously 
given and constant “fair” wage. Note that unlike Adriani and Becchetti (2004:13) I do not 
constrain fair firms to have zero profits.109  
 The fair wage is assumed to be higher than the “market” wage, which means that fair 
production has higher costs than unfair production. It is not clear that this must always be the 
case. For example, companies will often wish to treat their workers well in order to build a 
motivated and productive workforce, and ensure stability.110 However, judging from the fact 
that in other cases conditions for the workers seem to have been improved only after outside 
pressure, it seems reasonable to assume that fair production often means higher costs.111  
 As mentioned, firms in the North are constrained to produce in a fair manner. One 
might think of a “fair” wage institutionalized through minimum wage legislation. On the other 
                                                 
108 This assumption is unrealistic. North firms in reality are more productive, which might give more “room” for 
fair production. Also, North firms (i.e. multinational companies) established in the South may be able to pay 
higher wages than local firms exactly because they are more productive. See Snoen (2004:128). 
109 A fair firm required to have zero profits has some similarity with what Yunus (2006) called social businesses.  
110 See Snoen (2004:128). 
111 See e.g. Clouder and Harrison (2005). 
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hand, such legislation does not exist (or is not implemented) in the South, which means that 
South firms have the option of producing unfairly. However, I will in much of the discussion 
assume that there exists a fair firm, which is constrained to produce a fair good, by the 
idealism of its board, owners, or for other reasons. This firm produces a fair good even when 
it does not receive the fair price. However, the fair firm is not allowed to have negative 
profits. This means that if the price it receives is too low, the fair firm exits the market.  
 Labour (L) is the only factor of production. North and South firms are price takers in 
the North market for good x. The production function, displaying decreasing returns to scale, 
is given by  
 
 ( )i iX G L=   i = F, U, N  G’ >0,  G’’ < 0        (5.16) 
 
Xi  is production and Li  is the use of labour, where the subscripts F, U and N denote a fair 
South, an unfair South, and a North firm respectively. Profits of a North firm are  
 
 ( )N N N N NP G L w L∏ = −        (5.17) 
 
Given an interior solution, Northern firms’ optimal labour demand follows from the first order 
condition  
 
 '( )N N NP G L w=         (5.18) 
 
Profits of a fair South firm and an unfair South firm are, respectively, 
 
 ( )F F F F FP G L w L∏ = −        (5.19) 
 
 ( )U U U U UP G L w L∏ = −        (5.20) 
 
Given an interior solution, fair and unfair firms’ optimal labour demand follow from the first 
order condition with respect to the use of labour (the superscript L denotes the optimal choice 
when there is ethical labelling): 
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 '( )
F
L
F FP G L w=         (5.21) 
 
 '( )
U
L
U UP G L w=                                                                           (5.22) 
 
The level of production, profits and demand for labour of the two types of firms depend on 
prices and costs for the two types of production. Normally the demand of labour of the fair 
firm will not be high enough for all workers to get a job there, so that jobs in the fair firms are 
rationed. I assume South labour is homogenous, so that this rationing is not based on 
differences in productivity, but is a lottery.112 The rest of the workers approach the unfair 
firm. As will be discussed below, usually some of these will not get a job, and go to the 
informal sector. 
What prices each type of firm receives for their goods depend on what information 
consumers have about production conditions. With fair labelling, consumers are able to 
differentiate between goods from the two types of firms. While the fair firms always produce 
in a fair manner, the profit-maximizing firms choose the production technology that gives the 
highest profits. That is, they compare the profits resulting from the optimal production choices 
for fair and unfair production, respectively113 
 
 ( )
F F
L L L
F F FP G L w L∏ = −        (5.23) 
 
 ( )
U U
L L L
U U UP G L w L∏ = −        (5.24) 
 
For given costs for fair production relative to unfair production, if the fair price is sufficiently 
higher than the unfair price, also profit-maximizing firms will choose fair production. If this is 
the case, I will say consumer fairness is high. If there is some fairness, but not enough to 
make fair production absolutely more profitable, I shall say fairness is intermediate. Note 
however, that this definition is relative to a given difference in costs between fair and unfair 
production. This means for instance that if this difference is very small, consumer fairness 
                                                 
112 This assumption might not be innocuous. For example, Maurseth (2004) argues that multinational companies 
based in developing countries, by paying higher wages, may be able to attract the most productive labour. 
113 I assume that also profit-maximizing firms receive this price if they produce a fair good. Consumers then only 
care about whether the good is fair or not, and are not interested e.g. in the firms’ underlying motivations, 
whether other goods the firm is possibly producing are fair, etc. In practice, however, some consumers care also 
about this. It has for instance caused controversy that the company Nescafé, target of long-standing consumer 
boycotts, has launched a Fairtrade certified brand. See Ransom (2005). 
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does not have to be very high in absolute terms. Thus, the difference in costs decides how 
high fairness is necessary to make fair production most profitable. 
 
The situation without labelling 
Consider now that without fair labelling consumers are not able to distinguish between fair 
and unfair goods. Then fair and unfair firms sell their products in a common market for goods 
labelled “Made in South”, where the goods are assumed to be perfectly homogenous for the 
consumers, and receive the same price PS .  
The first order conditions for the two types of firms when there is no ethical labelling 
are then 
 
'( )
F
R
S FP G L w=         (5.25) 
 
 '( )RS U UP G L w=         (5.26) 
 
Comparing these with (5.21) and (5.22) above, we see that the fair firm will have a lower 
level of production compared to under fair labelling, while the unfair firm will produce more. 
This is seen by setting e.g. for the fair firm 
 
 '( )
F
R
S FP G L w= '( )FLFP G L=        (5.27) 
    
 
Since from (5.13) 
  
 FP  > SP  
 
we must have  
 
 '( )
F
RG L  > '( )
F
LG L         (5.28) 
 
which implies 
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F
LL > 
F
RL          (5.29) 
 
A similar argument can be made for the unfair firm, but with the reverse sign. The fair firm 
also has lower profits. Compared to the situation with full information, the fair firm therefore 
loses while the unfair firm gains. A way of seeing this is that the unfair firm has private 
information regarding its conditions of production, which allows the firm to capture a rent at 
the expense of fair firms and the fair consumers.  
As long as fair production is more costly than unfair production, no profit-maximizing 
firm will choose fair production in the situation without fair labelling. This is even so if 
consumers believe that all production in the South is fair and are therefore willing to pay the 
fair price. Indeed, this is the most fortunate situation for the unfair firm, since it then receives 
the fair price while only paying the costs for unfair production. 
 
Firms’ signalling of their fairness 
From the above a natural question is why the fair firms do not signal their fairness directly to 
consumers. As mentioned in section 4.6 in reality firms often do exactly this, e.g. through 
own “fair” brands. However, also an unfair firm has the incentive to pretend that its goods are 
fair, since it will then receive the higher fair price for its products.114 As independent fair 
labelling in this model is the only source of information, consumers cannot know whether a 
particular firm is fair or not. Therefore, we can also interpret p as consumers’ subjective 
probability that a product labelled “fair”, is in fact fair.115  
 
The profits from South firms 
I assume that neither North consumers nor South workers receive the profits from the two 
types of South firms. As far as South workers are concerned, I find the assumption 
reasonable.116 It leaves the picture of welfare in the South incomplete, but reflects the idea 
that the owners of the firms receive the most of the gains.117 As for North consumers, it could 
be interesting to assume that these also receive profits from South firms through shares in 
transnational companies. In this case they are possibly also ethical investors. But also ethical 
investors need ethical information, and it might be implausible to assume that such 
                                                 
114 This is of course a cynical view of firms, but follows from the assumption of profit-maximization. 
115 Some implications of this are discussed in section 5.6 below. 
116 However, a fair firm might distribute some of its profits to workers. 
117 See e.g. Klein (2000), Ransom (2001) and Gaarder (2004). 
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information is available to North individuals as investors, but not as consumers. For the 
moment, I just assume that a third group outside the model receives the South firms’ 
profits.118  
  
5.1.3   Individuals in the South  
Disregarding ethical concerns, South production of the good x is a perfect substitute for North 
production. However, like in Adriani and Becchetti (2004:9), x is not consumed in the South, 
and South individuals instead consume an internationally traded good y . I assume that the 
fairness of y  is not an issue, so that only the quantity consumed of the good enters in South 
individuals’ utility functions. Normalizing the price of y  to 1, we have simply 
 
 ( )U y y=          (5.30) 
 
The labour supply of South individuals is based on a Harris-Todaro framework for 
migration.119 Migration from the rural areas to the urban areas occurs until the expected wage 
in the city is equal to the rural wage. The expected wage in the city is a probability-weighted 
average (i.e. shares of the urban population) of the wages in the fair firm, in the unfair firm, 
and the income in the urban informal sector. In the analysis, I assume that migration has 
stopped, and that the urban population is therefore given. However, in practice we must 
expect increased migration if the urban expected wage increases, which may be one result of 
fair labelling.  
 As mentioned, the allocation of workers to the two types of firms is not based on 
differences in worker productivity, but is a lottery. Since wF  is highest, workers go to the fair 
firm until it has satisfied its demand for labour.120 The rest of the workers approach the profit-
maximizing firms. wU  can here be taken as the “market” wage. However, I assume that this 
wage does not equalize demand for labour in the unfair firms and the residual supply of 
labour. The reason is that the firm, since it cannot monitor worker effort perfectly, needs to 
pay workers a higher wage to motivate them to put in the desired effort (efficiency wages). By 
paying a higher wage than the workers’ alternatives, the firm ensures worker effort because it 
                                                 
118 I return to this when I discuss public ethical investment in section 5.5 below. 
119 See Bardhan and Udry (1999:50-3) 
120 In reality, both workers’ information about firms’ wages and their mobility between firms could be limited. 
However, I disregard these complications here. 
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will be more costly for workers to lose their job.121 This also means that a share of the urban 
workforce will not be able to get a regular job. These will work in the informal sector with a 
low income, which I for simplicity will set equal to zero.  
The indirect utility of a South worker in a fair firm and an unfair firm, respectively, are  
 
 ( )F F FU w w=          (5.31)  
 
 ( )U U UU w w=          (5.32) 
 
For simplicity, I assume that Uw  is unchanged in the course of the analysis. However, it might 
be endogenous e.g. to the size of the urban informal sector and to the number of workers in 
the fair firm. 
 As FL   workers work in fair firms and UL   work in unfair firms, and with the income 
in the informal sector set equal to zero, aggregate welfare in the South without ethical 
labelling (the superscript R denoting “risk”) can be written as  
 
 R R RF F U US w L w L= +         (5.33) 
  
Welfare in the South is increasing in employment both in fair and unfair firms. However, a 
given increase in employment will increase welfare more if it comes in a fair firm. 
 
5.2 Public policy 1:   Ethical labelling of all goods from the South 
The first public strategy we consider is labelling of all goods from the South with respect to 
the fairness in their production.  
 
5.2.1 Welfare in the South 
The results are summed up in table 5.1 and explained in the following.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 See Moene (2005). Note that I do not incorporate some other important features of Moene’s model, among 
these demand linkages between the formal and the informal sector.  
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Producer side in the South                     
 
Ex ante no fair firms in the market 
 
Consumer fairness 
Ex ante fair firms in the 
market 
Fair firm enters market Fair firm does not enter 
market 
 
No fairness 
 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
Intermediate fairness 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for new 
workers in fair firm 
 
 
Negative for workers  
who go from unfair firm 
to informal sector 
 
 
Positive for new 
workers in fair firm 
 
 
Negative for workers  
who go from unfair firm 
to informal sector 
 
 
Negative for workers 
who go from unfair firm 
to informal sector 
 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
Positive for all workers 
(except possibly some 
workers who lose their 
job in profit-maximizing 
firm) 
 
 
Positive for all workers 
(except possibly some 
workers who lose their 
job in profit-maximizing 
firm) 
 
Positive for all workers 
(except possibly some 
workers who lose their 
job in profit-maximizing 
firm) 
 
Table 5.1 Welfare effects in the South from ethical labelling 
 
No consumer fairness 
We look first at the case with no consumer fairness. No fairness in this context means that 
consumers only care about the quantity of the good. This means relaxing the assumption that 
θρ  < 1, and instead allowing θρ  = 1. Consumers are now indifferent between North and 
South goods, as long as the price is the same. Consumers have no extra willingness to pay for 
the possibility that a South product is fair. Therefore, the South good without ethical labelling 
will not receive a higher price than would an unfair good. This means that both consumers’ p 
and ethical labelling are irrelevant.  
 
Intermediate consumer fairness 
In this case, consumers have some fairness (i.e. ρ  < 1 and θρ  < 1). However, this fairness is 
not high enough to make fair production absolutely more profitable. In this case, the results 
depend on consumers’ p and on whether there are ex ante fair firms in the South. The 
subcases are as follows. 
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Ex ante fair firms in the South market 
Introducing ethical labelling will normally mean that the fair firms get a higher price for their 
products, while the unfair firms get a lower price. This means that fair firms will increase 
their production while unfair firms will reduce their production. Fair firms will increase their 
demand for labour, so that more workers are now able to get a job in a fair firm.  
On the other hand, ethical labelling will also mean that the unfair firm receives a lower 
price for its product in the North. It will therefore produce less, and its demand for labour will 
go down. This means that some of its workers lose their job and end up in the informal sector. 
Formally, welfare in the South with ethical labelling is 
 
 L L LF F U US w L w L= +         (5.34) 
 
To see the effects on welfare of ethical labelling in this situation we can subtract (5.33) from 
(5.34), which gives 
 
 L R L L R RF F U U F F U US S w L w L w L w L− = + − −  
or       
 ( ) ( )L R L R L RF F F U U US S w L L w L L− = − + −      (5.35)  
 
Using (5.29) above, the first term is positive, and represents the increased welfare of the 
workers who are now able to get a job in a fair firm. By a similar argument for the unfair firm, 
but with the reverse sign, the second term is negative (assuming Uw  is constant), since some 
workers in the unfair firms lose their job and have to go to the informal sector. 
How large this effect is for the two firms, depends on how large is the difference 
between the price of the South good without ethical labelling, and the prices for the fair and 
the unfair good, respectively. The importance of p here comes through its effect on the price 
of the South good without ethical labelling. If p was very high, consumers trusted that most 
South products were fair, and the unlabelled South good received a high price. The effect in 
terms on increased price for the fair firm from ethical labelling are then not so large, and its 
demand for labour is not increased so much. On the other hand, the unfair firm will receive a 
much lower price when it can no longer benefit from high consumer trust. Its production and 
demand for labour will therefore be reduced significantly.  
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Thus, for a given level of consumer fairness, the lower is p, the more the South has to 
gain from ethical labelling (as long as there is ex post a fair South alternative available to 
North consumers). Assume for example that p = 0, but that in reality there are fair firms. Then 
ethical labelling will show ethical consumers that there are fair firms, and these will now 
receive a higher far price for their products and can employ more workers. Also, since the 
South good without ethical labelling did not receive a higher price than the unfair product, 
unfair firms’ production and demand for labour will be unaffected, so that no one will be 
worse off in this case.  
At the other extreme, if p = 1, consumers thought all South products were fair, and 
were willing to pay the fair price for all South products. Fair firms will then not receive a 
higher price with ethical labelling than without, and there are no positive effects. At the same 
time, unfair South firms who used to receive the fair price will now only receive the unfair 
price, which will give a large reduction in production and hence employment.  
 
Ex ante no fair firms in the South market 
If there are ex ante no fair firms in the South market, and only intermediate consumer 
fairness, the model says that ethical labelling can be harmful for the South, for a p larger than 
zero. North consumers were then too “optimistic”, and believed mistakenly that a share of the 
products from the South were fair. Ethical labelling will lead some consumers to switch from 
South products to North products, as they know that North products are fair. This may be 
understood as a boycott (in a narrow sense) of unfair South products. Since the unfair South 
firms now receive a lower price for their products, they will export less. This will lead to 
reduced demand for labour, and the number of employed South workers decreases. With the 
superscript LN denoting the case with no fair alternative,  
 
LN
UL
 < RUL         (5.36) 
 
There are now only negative effects on welfare in the South122  
 
                                                 
122 This result resembles the result in Adriani and Becchetti (2004:20) that in the absence of fair production, 
North consumers’ preferences for fairness are harmful to welfare in the South. While actual boycotts will have 
negative effects in the short run, a credible threat of boycotts could have the effect of leading firms to choose fair 
production. See Innes (2006) for a theoretical perspective. Also, a boycott of one firm may “scare” other firms. 
See Clouder and Harrison (2005:99). However, I will not discuss this further here.  
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 ( )LN R LN RU U US S w L L− = −        (5.37) 
  
In fact, welfare in this case would be higher if consumers had no preferences for fair 
production.  
However, there is one situation where this result does not hold. As we remember, fair 
firms need a certain price in order to be able to stay in the market. Denote this price as PMIN. 
With intermediate fairness the fair price will be higher than the price for the good labelled 
“Made in South”. This means that we could have the following relationship between prices: 
 
 SP   < MINP  < FP         (5.38) 
 
In this case, the higher fair price enables fair firms to enter the market. The effects will then 
be the similar as in the case when there is ex ante a fair firm in the market. 
 More generally, in my model the result that consumer fairness is harmful in the ex ante 
absence of fair firms in the South is true only for intermediate levels of fairness. The reason is 
that high fairness in this model makes fair production absolutely more profitable, which 
means that profit-maximizing firms will change to fair production. 
 
High fairness   
Suppose now that consumer fairness in the North is so high that fair production becomes 
absolutely more profitable. For a given relationship between the costs of fair and unfair 
production, I will then say consumer fairness is high. In this case it does not matter whether 
there is ex ante fair firm in the South. This is because high consumer fairness will mean that 
profit-maximizing firms realize that fair production is absolutely more profitable, and they 
will therefore change to fair production.123 The consumers now have only a fair alternative. 
The effects on welfare are now (LO denotes L for “Labelling” and O for “Only fair good”, 
while the subscript P denotes profit-maximizing firms producing in a fair manner.) 
 
 LO R LO LO R RF F F P F F U US S w L w L w L w L− = + − −  
 
                                                 
123 That firms should know this is a strong assumption, especially if they have not observed a choice between fair 
and unfair products. It is probably more realistic to assume that firms are uncertain about consumer fairness. This 
might weaken the conclusion that strong consumer fairness is a sufficient condition.  
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   ( )LO R LO RF F F F P U Uw L L w L w L= − + −      (5.39) 
 
The first term in this expression is the increased welfare of the workers that find employment 
in a fair firm. The two last terms contain two effects. On the one hand, the increased wage for 
workers, and on the other hand the effects on employment in the profit-maximizing firm from 
changing to fair production. There are two effects on employment which pull in opposite 
directions. The higher fair product price means that the firm would like to increase output and 
therefore employment. However, the higher factor price means that firms would like to reduce 
the use of the factor. We cannot be sure which of these two effects will be the strongest.  
If the net effect on labour demand is non-negative, the effects can be illustrated more 
clearly by adding and subtracting RF Uw L  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )LO R LO R R LO RF F F F U U F P US S w L L w w L w L L− = − + − + −    (5.40) 
 
The first term is the same as above. The second term is the increased welfare of the workers 
who were already in the unfair firm and now have higher wages. The third term is either zero 
or positive, depending on whether the net effects on employment in the profit-maximizing 
firm are zero or positive. If they are positive, the third term represents the increased welfare of 
workers who go from the informal sector to a job in the profit-maximizing firm for a fair 
wage. 
 If the net effect on labour demand is negative, we instead add and subtract wUNPLO to 
get 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )LO R LO R LO LO RF F F F U P U P US S w L L w w L w L L− = − + − + −    (5.41) 
 
The second term now is the increased welfare through higher wages of a smaller number of 
workers who stay in the profit-maximizing firm. The third term, however, is negative and 
represents the reduced income of workers who lose their job in the profit-maximizing firm. 
 We note from this that in this model a sufficient condition for all regular production to 
be fair, is that North consumers’ “aggregate” fairness is high enough. Note also that in this 
situation the “market” wage and the minimum “fair” wage are the same. However, it is 
possible that some workers will lose their job because of reduced labour demand in the profit-
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maximizing firm, and in any case normally some workers will still be left in the informal 
sector. 
 
5.2.2 Welfare in the North 
The welfare analysis for North consumers follows the lines of Adriani and Becchetti (2004). 
The results are summed up in table 5.2. 
 
Producer side in the South                     
 
Ex ante no fair firms in the market 
 
Consumer fairness 
Ex ante fair firms in the 
market 
Fair firm enters market No fair firm enters 
market 
 
No fairness 
 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
Intermediate fairness 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for all  
consumers 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for all  
consumers 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative for most  
consumers 
 
Possibly positive for 
least fair  consumers 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
Positive for consumers 
who switch to fair 
product 
 
Negative for least 
fair consumers 
 
 
Positive for consumers 
who switch to fair 
product 
 
Negative for least 
fair consumers 
 
Positive for consumers 
who switch to fair 
product 
 
Negative for least 
fair consumers 
 
Table 5.2 Welfare effects in the North from ethical labelling 
 
No fairness 
Also when it comes to North consumers, this case is particularly simple. If no North 
consumers care about fairness, neither their p nor ethical labelling is relevant. 
 
Intermediate fairness 
The welfare effects for North consumers depend on whether there is ex ante a fair alternative 
in the South. First, for PF  = PN, the fair South product is strictly preferred to the North 
product, and the North product will be out of the market. To make the analysis simpler, and 
since it does not affect the main conclusions, I will henceforth assume that this is what 
happens when ethical labelling is introduced. This then justifies (5.11). 
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Ethical labelling now leads the North consumers who were consuming the North 
product to switch to the fair South product. Also some of the consumers that consumed the 
“Made in South” good switch to the fair product, while the remaining consumers buy the 
unfair South product. The fair South product receives a higher price than the South product 
without ethical labelling, while the unfair South product receives a lower price. With αU 
denoting the consumer indifferent between an unfair and a fair South product, and using PF  = 
PN, welfare in the North is now 
 
1 1
1
0
( )
U
U
L
W WN NN d dP PU N
α αα
α α
α
α αθρ θ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫     (5.42) 
 
We compare this with expression (5.15), which is given again for convenience: 
 
 
1 1
1
0
( (1 ) )
S
S
R
W WN NN p p d dP PS N
α αα
αα
α
α αρθ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫    
 
Consumers in the North fall into three categories. First, the consumers who used to consume 
the North product, but switch to the fair South product, must be better off. Now they can 
consume South goods without ethical risk. Second, the consumers who prefer to consume an 
unfair South product will also be better off because they can now get the South product for a 
lower price, and thus consume a larger quantity. Finally, the consumers who were previously 
consuming the ethically risky South product and are now consuming the fair South product 
must be better off by revealed preference. They could get an unfair South good for a lower 
price than the South good without ethical labelling, but they still choose to consume the fair 
South good.  
If there is ex ante no fair firm in the South, fair labelling may lead to reduced welfare 
also in the North. Some consumers switch to consuming North products, while some keep on 
consuming the unfair South product. With αUN denoting the consumer indifferent between the 
North good and the unfair South good, welfare in the North is  
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1 1
1
0
( )
UN
UN
LN
W WN NN d dP PU N
α αα
α
α
α αθρ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫     (5.43) 
 
The consumers who switch to the North product must be worse off after ethical labelling, 
since their welfare from consuming the ethically risky South product was higher than that 
from consuming the North product.124 This effect is stronger the higher was p. For consumers 
who keep on consuming the South product, the effect is unclear. On the one hand, some of 
them had a higher welfare from consuming an ethically risky South product than an unfair 
South product. On the other hand, the price of the unfair South product is now lower. This 
means that the consumers who are least concerned with fairness must be better off. Also this 
effect is stronger the higher was p, since the greater will be the reduction in the price of the 
South good. 
 However, if the higher fair price allows fair firms to enter the market (see (5.38) 
above), effects are as in the situation when there ex ante are fair firms in the South. 
 
High fairness 
As discussed above, with high fairness it does not matter whether there is ex ante a fair 
alternative or not. The only alternative will be the fair South product. With the superscript LO 
denoting the case with only the fair alternative, welfare is 
 
 
1
1
0
LO
WNN PN
α
αθ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫         (5.44) 
 
When there is only a fair good, αS is not determined.125 But note that (5.44) can be written 
as126  
 
 
1 1
1
0
S
S
LO
W WN NN d dP PN N
α αα
α α
α
α αθ θ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫     (5.45) 
 
                                                 
124 “Ignorance is bliss”. 
125 See Adriani and Becchetti (2004:17). 
126 See Adriani and Becchetti (2004:19-20). 
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We can now write the difference between (5.45) and the welfare without ethical labelling as  
 
 
1 1
0
( (1 ) )
S
LO R
W WN NN N p p dP PN S
α αα
αα α αρθ θ
− −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− = − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫  
 
   ( )
1
1
1
S
WN dPN
α
α
α
αθ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫      (5.46) 
 
The second term is positive (assuming θ  > 1) and represents the welfare improvement for the 
consumers that are most concerned with fairness. Since average consumer fairness is very 
high in this case, one would think that most consumers are better off. However, the first term 
is not necessarily positive, as the consumers that are mainly concerned with the quantity of 
the good have to pay a higher price for the good than before, and will therefore be able to 
afford less of it. 
 
5.3 Public policy 2:   Ensure a fair alternative  
The interest of this second public policy arises from two observations. First, we saw 
in the analysis of ethical labelling above that for intermediate consumer fairness, fair labelling 
will be harmful for the South if there is ex post no fair alternative. We also saw that if there is 
a fair alternative, ethical labelling will lead some consumers to start consuming fair South 
products, while others will consume unfair products. For the latter group, who do not care 
(sufficiently) about fairness in production, ethical labelling is not relevant. One could 
therefore argue that rather than ethical labelling as such, the existence of a fair alternative is 
the public good we should be concerned about. Instead of labelling all goods, a better strategy 
for the authorities might therefore be to ensure that there is a fair alternative. The authorities 
can e.g. offer firms to certify their products as fair, given that they satisfy the criteria for fair 
production. Fair firms will seize this opportunity. The profit-maximizing firms will also want 
their products certified if fair production is more profitable, because the certification will 
enable them to charge the fair price. If there are ex ante no fair firms and fair production is not 
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absolutely more profitable, the authorities might have to find other ways to ensure a fair 
alternative in the market.127 
The welfare implications of this can be studied by introducing a fair alternative in the 
situation where there is only the product labelled “Made in South”. The consumers can now 
choose between two products from the South: One that is labelled fair, and one that is not 
labelled.  
 
5.3.1 Welfare in the South 
The results are summed up in table 5.3. Note how this table differs from 5.1 and 5.2 by the 
fact that there is now always a fair alternative. Instead, the effects now depend on whether p 
changes or not. 
     
Consumer beliefs about fairness in the South 
                                      
Consumer 
fairness 
p unchanged 
 
p reduced 
 
No fairness 
 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
Intermediate 
fairness 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for new workers in fair firm 
 
Unchanged for other workers 
 
 
 
Positive for new workers in fair firm 
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
Positive for all workers (except possibly 
negative for some workers who lose their job 
in profit-maximizing firm) 
 
 
Positive for all workers (except possibly 
negative for some workers who lose their job 
in profit-maximizing firm) 
    
Table 5.3 Welfare effects in the South from guaranteeing a fair alternative 
 
No fairness 
Also here, the case with no consumer fairness is simple: As long as its price is higher, no 
consumers will choose the fair product. 
 
Intermediate fairness 
The consumers that are most concerned with fairness will switch from the North good to the 
fair South good, as will some of the consumers that were consuming the unlabelled South 
                                                 
127 One possibility, public ethical investment, is discussed below. 
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good. The least fair consumers, on the other hand, will continue consuming the unlabelled 
South good, since this is cheapest. However, the effects also depend on whether consumers’ p 
for the remaining South goods changes or not. If it does not, the price received by the firms 
that do not get the fair label will not change, and there will be no negative effects from 
workers losing their jobs in these firms. The effect on welfare in the South is then (A denotes 
“alternative”) 
 
 ( )A R A RF F FS S w L L− = −        (5.47) 
 
However, the introduction of a fair alternative could lead consumers to reduce their p.128 If we 
e.g. have rational expectations in the sense that consumers’ p is accurate, one must expect 
consumers to reduce their p for the remaining goods. With the superscript AC denoting 
“alternative” and “changed p”, the welfare effects in the South are then 
 
 ( ) ( )AC R AC R AC RF F F U U US S w L L w L L− = − + −      (5.48) 
 
The first term is the same as the first term in expression (5.47). The second term represents 
the negative effect on workers who lose their job in the profit-maximizing firms, as these now 
get a lower price for their product. The larger the reduction in p, the more important is this 
effect. An extreme situation is when consumers believe that all fair goods now carry the fair 
label. In this case their p for the remaining South goods is zero, and the unlabelled South good 
receives only the unfair price. 
 The accuracy of p is also important. First, if all fair firms are in fact labelled fair, the 
situation is equivalent to labelling of all products with regard to their fairness. On the other 
hand, if consumers get the impression that all fair firms are now certified fair, but there still 
are fair firms that for various reasons are not certified, introducing a fair alternative is actually 
welfare inferior to labelling all products. 
  
High fairness 
With high fairness, fair production will be absolutely more profitable. The fair firms will seek 
to have their product labelled fair, and the profit-maximizing firms will change to fair 
production and do the same. Since all firms sell a fair product, and there no longer will be an 
                                                 
128 I consider an increased p to be unrealistic. 
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unlabelled alternative from the South, p is irrelevant. With the superscript AO denoting the 
situation with certification and only a fair good, and the subscript P as above denoting a 
profit-maximizing firm with fair production, the effects on welfare in the South are now  
 
 AO R AO AO R RF F F P F F U US S w L w L w L w L− = + − −  
 
  ( )AO R AO RF F F F P U Uw L L w L w L= − + −      (5.49) 
 
As for (5.39) above, we cannot be sure whether the net effects on the labour demand of the 
profit-maximizing firms are positive or negative. If they are non-negative, by adding and 
subtracting RF Uw L
  we can write the welfare expression more communicatively as  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )AO R AO R R AO RF F F F U U F P US S w L L w w L w L L− = − + − + −   (5.50) 
 
The first term is the increased welfare of new workers that are employed in the fair firms. The 
second term is the increased welfare of the workers who were already in the unfair firm and 
who now receive higher wages. The third term is the increased welfare of new workers in the 
profit-maximizing firm who used to be in the informal sector but who now receive the fair 
wage (or the unchanged welfare of workers who stay in the informal sector). 
 If the net effects on the labour demand of the profit-maximizing firm are negative, we 
instead add and subtract AOU Pw L  to get   
 
( ) ( ) ( )AO R AO R AO AO RF F F F U P U P US S w L L w w L w L L− = − + − + −    (5.51) 
 
The first term is the same as before. The second term now represents the increased welfare 
through higher wages of a smaller number of workers who stay in the fair firm. The third term 
is negative, and represents the reduced income of workers who lose their job in the profit-
maximizing firm. 
 
5.3.2 Welfare in the North 
Results are summed up in table 5.4 and explained below. 
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No consumer fairness 
The fair alternative will be irrelevant for consumers who are unconcerned with fairness. 
 
Consumer beliefs about fairness in the South 
                                      
Consumer fairness 
p unchanged 
 
p reduced 
 
No fairness 
 
 
 
No effects 
 
No effects 
 
Intermediate fairness 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for consumers who switch 
to the fair product 
 
Unchanged for other consumers 
 
 
 
Positive for consumers who switch  
to the fair product  
 
Possibly positive for consumers who  
continue consuming South product 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
 
Positive for consumers who switch
to the fair product 
 
Unchanged for least 
concerned consumers 
 
 
Positive for consumers who switch  
to the fair product  
 
Possibly negative for 
least concerned consumers 
 
       
Table 5.4 Welfare effects in the North from guaranteeing a fair alternative 
 
Intermediate fairness 
I assume that North production of the good ceases. With αA denoting the consumer indifferent 
between consuming the fair South good and the “Made in South” good, welfare in the North 
is 
 
1 1
1
0
( (1 ) )
A
A
A
W WN NN p p d dP PS N
α αα
αα α
α
α αρθ θ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫   (5.52) 
  
Again we compare with (5.11) 
 
 
1 1
1
0
( (1 ) )
S
S
R
W WN NN p p d dP PS N
α αα
αα
α
α αρθ
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫    
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Consumers fall into three categories. First, the consumers who used to consume the North 
product, but switch to consuming the fair South product, are better off, as they can now 
consume South goods without ethical risk. For the consumers who continue to consume the 
“Made in South” product effects depend on whether p changes or not. If p is unchanged, the 
price of the good is unchanged and also their welfare. If p changes effects might be unclear 
for some consumers. On the one hand, the price of the good is lower, but on the other hand 
ethical risk increases. However, for the consumers who are mainly concerned with the 
quantity of the good, the increased ethical risk will be less important than the lower price. 
Finally, consumers who were previously consuming the “Made in South” good and are now 
consuming the fair South product are better off by revealed preference. This is because they 
could consume the “Made in South” good for a lower price than before, but choose the fair 
South good. 
 
High fairness 
With high fairness, there will be only fair goods in the market. In this case, the results are the 
same as for fair labelling of all South products. 
 
5.4 Public policy 3: International standards  
This policy differs from the policies described above. Effective international legislation 
means that firms in the South no longer have the option of unfair production. This amounts to 
requiring all South firms to pay their workers the fair wage. The authorities then go one step 
further than just allowing consumers to exercise consumer power by providing information 
and/or a fair alternative. Consumers now no longer have the choice of an unfair product. 
Policy-makers could have good moral reasons for disregarding consumer sovereignty here. 
However, despite the good intentions of the authorities, it is not clear that welfare effects will 
always be predominantly positive for the South. 
As I have assumed that fair production is more costly, international standards will lead 
production costs to increase in all previously unfair firms. The welfare effects depend on the 
fairness and information of North consumers. I will here distinguish between two cases: One 
case in which North consumers are aware of the existence of international standards, and one 
case where they are not.  
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5.4.1 Welfare in the South 
See table 5.5 for a summary. Note again how this table differs from the previous ones; in this 
case consumer information about the standards may be crucial for the results. 
 
Consumer information about international standards 
                                      
Consumer fairness 
Informed  
 
Uninformed 
 
No fairness 
 
 
 
Positive for workers in unfair firms 
who get higher wages 
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
 
 
Positive for workers in unfair firms  
who get higher wages 
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
 
Intermediate fairness 
 
 
Positive for new workers in 
fair firm 
 
Positive for workers in unfair firms 
who get higher wages 
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
(but these are fewer when 
consumers are informed) 
 
 
Positive for workers in unfair firms  
who get higher wages  
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
 
Same as for Public policy 1 and 
Public policy 2 
 
 
Positive for workers in unfair firms  
who get higher wages 
 
Negative for workers who go from  
unfair firm to informal sector 
 
 
Table 5.5 Welfare effects in the South from international standards 
 
No fairness 
In this case, whether consumers have ethical information about the products or not does not 
matter. International standards have two effects for welfare in the South. First, they increase 
the welfare of some workers who previously received the unfair wage, but now receive the 
fair wage. However, since costs increase for the profit-maximizing firms, they will employ 
fewer workers, which means that a number of workers lose their job. The fair firms, on the 
other hand, are not affected even if consumers are informed, because there in any case is no 
higher willingness to pay for a fair product. Therefore, with the superscript SN denoting the 
situation with standards and no fairness, 
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 SN RF FL L=           (5.53) 
 
Welfare effects in the South are  
 
SN R SN SN R R
F F F P F F U US S w L w L w L w L− = + − −   
    SN RF P U Uw L w L= −        (5.54) 
 
The effects can be seen more clearly by adding and subtracting SNU Pw L  
 
 
( ) ( )SN R SN SN RF U F U P US S w w L w L L− = − + −      (5.55) 
 
The first term is the increased welfare, through higher wages, of the workers that stay in the 
unfair firm. The second term is the reduced welfare of the workers who lose their job in the 
unfair firm.  
 
Intermediate fairness 
In this case, ethical information is important. We look first at the case with informed 
consumers. International standards means that consumers know all goods from the South are 
fair. Therefore, all South goods now receive the fair price. Fair firms are then able to expand 
their production and employ more workers. Also, although the costs of the profit-maximizing 
firms increase, this is partly compensated for by a higher price for their products. Therefore, 
with informed consumers (the superscript SI denoting standards and informed consumers), 
welfare effects in the South are 
  
 SI R SI SI R RF F F P F F U US S w L w L w L w L− = + − −      (5.56) 
 
The effects can be seen more clearly by adding and subtracting SIU Pw L  
 
( ) ( ) ( )SI R SI R SI SI RF F F F U P U P US S w L L w w L w L L− = − + − + −    (5.57) 
 
The first term is the increased welfare of the new workers that find a job in the fair firm. The 
second term is the increased welfare, through higher wages, of the workers who stay in the 
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unfair firm. The last term is the reduced welfare of workers who lose their job in the unfair 
firm, since it reduces its demand for labour. 
 In the situation with uninformed consumers, on the other hand, things are different. 
South products will now not receive the fair price. This means that there is no positive effect 
through increased demand for labour in the fair firm. In addition, the profit-maximizing firm 
will not receive a higher price to compensate for some of the cost increase. Therefore, the 
demand for labour in the profit-maximizing firm will be higher in the situation with informed 
consumers, i.e. 
 
 SIPL  > 
SU
PL
        (5.58) 
 
By similar calculations as for (5.55), we find   
 
( ) ( )SU R SU SU RF U P U P US S w w L w L L− = − + −      (5.59) 
 
This situation is clearly welfare-inferior to the situation with informed consumers.  
 
High fairness 
If consumers are informed, the constraint of international standards is not binding, since fair 
production is in any case most profitable. Then the effects will be the same as for fair 
labelling or guaranteeing a fair alternative.  
 The case with uninformed consumers, however, is again different. In fact, even if 
consumer fairness is high, so that North consumers would be willing to pay for the increased 
costs of fair production, the lack of information now leads international standards to have a 
predominantly negative impact on welfare in the South. This points to the importance of 
information. A clear policy implication seems to be that an introduction of international 
standards must be accompanied by informing North consumers that effective international 
standards are in place.  
  
5.4.2 Welfare in the North 
See table 5.6 for a summary. 
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No fairness 
When consumers are unconcerned with fairness, the effects of international standards do not 
depend on whether they are informed or not. In this case, the unlabelled South good is not 
able to get a higher price than would an unfair good. All consumers will be consuming the 
South good if this is cheaper than the North good. However, since the costs of South firms 
increase, the offer curve for products “Made in South” will shift back, and because the 
demand curve is downward sloping (see equation (5.5) above), some of the cost increase will 
be passed on to North consumers, who will be worse off. 
 
Consumer information about international standards 
                                      
Consumer fairness 
Informed  
 
Uninformed 
 
No fairness 
 
 
 
Unchanged/negative for all consumers
 
 
Negative for all consumers 
 
 
Intermediate fairness 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive for most fair consumers 
 
 
Negative for least fair consumers 
 
 
Negative for all consumers  
 
 
 
High fairness 
 
 
 
Same as for Public policy 1 
and Public policy 2 
 
 
Negative for all consumers  
 
 
Table 5.6 Welfare effects in the North from international standards 
 
 
Intermediate fairness 
When there is intermediate fairness, the welfare effects for consumers depend on their 
information. If consumers are informed, the most concerned consumers will have increased 
utility from knowing that the good is fair. Consumers who switch from the North good to the 
certified fair South goods must be better off. Also some consumers who were consuming the 
“Made in South” good are better off, even if the price is higher, since the product is now 
guaranteed fair. However, the consumers who are mainly concerned with the quantity of the 
good will be worse off, since the higher price means that they can consume less than before. 
With the superscript SI denoting the situation with standards and informed consumers, welfare 
in the North is 
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1
1
0
SI
WNN PN
α
αθ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫        (5.60) 
  
By similar calculations as for (5.46) above, we find the following expression 
 
1 1
0
( (1 ) )
S
SI R
W WN NN N p p dP PN S
α α
α
αα α αρθ θ
∧ − −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− = − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫    
 
( )
1
1
1
S
WN dPN
α
α
α
αθ
∧
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫      (5.61) 
 
Note that Sα∧  > Sα . This is because the number of consumers choosing the North product 
rather than the “Made in South” product in the situation without labelling, will be higher with 
high fairness than if fairness is only intermediate. This also means that the positive effects 
from the fact that the South product is now fair, are smaller than if fairness was high. 
If consumers are not informed, they cannot derive utility from the fact that the South 
good is now fair. While the welfare of the consumers who were consuming the North product 
is unchanged, all other consumers are worse off. Some consumers will continue consuming 
the South good for a higher price than before, while some consumers will switch to the North 
good since the higher price means they are compensated less for the experienced ethical risk 
of consuming the South good. 
 
High fairness 
As mentioned above, if there is high consumer fairness and consumers are informed, 
international standards are irrelevant. Therefore welfare effects are the same as with high 
consumer fairness under Public policy 1 and Public policy 2.  
 When consumers are not informed, things are quite different. In this case, all products 
are fair, which should have meant that most consumers will be better off. However, since they 
are not aware of the standards, the increased price of the South good means that consumers’ 
utility will decrease. 
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5.5 Public policy 4: Public ethical investment 
Finally, I will just say some words about a fourth possible policy. In section 5.1.2, I opened 
up for the possibility of ethical investment by discussing the distribution of South firms’ 
profits. Depending on whether ethical investors have other information than ethical 
consumers, ethical investment may ensure fair production where ethical consumption fails. A 
possible strategy for the authorities could therefore be to use its investments to ensure fair 
production in the firms it owns in the South. What would be the welfare effects of this?  
 First, as we have seen, in the model ethical investment means a redistribution of 
profits from the owners of the firms to the workers. The authorities, like other investors, 
might feel they can afford this. However, requiring fair production through ethical investment 
will also normally mean that the firm is able to employ fewer workers than it otherwise could 
have done. As in the case with international standards, the effects depend on consumers’ 
fairness and information. If there is no consumer fairness, or consumers are not aware that the 
products are fair, some workers will have better conditions, while others lose their job. For 
intermediate fairness and informed consumers, some of the reduction in employment from 
higher wages will be offset by a higher price for the countries’ products. Finally, if consumer 
fairness is high, also ethical investment is irrelevant. 
 
5.6   Extension: Consumer trust as a public good for firms 
Consumers’ p will be one of the factors determining which price the unfair firm can get for its 
“fair” product. If consumer trust is low, this price will also be low. In section 3.2 I presented 
the idea of consumer trust as a public good for firms. This corresponds to p in the model. 
Although I have not modelled a process for the formation of p, it could be affected negatively 
e.g. by the number of reports in the media of bad working conditions. A profit-maximizing 
firm chooses fair or unfair production, knowing that if it is “caught” in unfair production, it 
contributes to lower consumer trust. However, the cost of lower general consumer trust is 
shared by all firms (also fair firms).129 This means that the firms face a “tragedy of the 
commons”-problem.  
However, we also saw that many firms seek to “privatize” consumer trust, in order to 
become less vulnerable to the bad practices of other members of their industry. As mentioned 
                                                 
129 There is another interesting point to be made here. It is well known that bad news seem to get more attention 
than good news. Even only sporadic reports of bad working conditions in the factories of transnational 
companies in the South might leave consumers cynical, even if most of the time, conditions are OK. Even a very 
few cases of firms choosing unfair production can thus do great harm if consumers are very concerned with 
fairness. 
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this also means a privatization of risk. If the firm is caught treating its workers badly, it will 
see the value of its particular brand reduced. The effects are then no longer symmetrical. This 
supports the argument that transnational “brand” companies might be a catalyst for improved 
conditions in poor countries, since consumers have a brand to which they can address their 
concerns, rather than an entire industry, or a mass of “faceless” local producers.130 However, 
this effect depends on the ability of e.g. the media and NGOs to “arrest” the companies that 
have unfair production (i.e. the probability of being caught).  
 
5.7   More on public policy  
Though I have concluded that the authorities might have a role to play in the provision of fair 
goods, this does not mean that they themselves have to produce the service.131 Broadly, there 
are four ways of sharing responsibilities between the public and the private sector. One can 
have public financing and production; public financing, but private production; private 
financing and public production; and private financing and production. A possibility is public 
financing, but private production. It would seem natural to base the work of labelling goods 
on the organizations that already exist, like Fairtrade. The authorities could support 
financially schemes like Fairtrade to give them the resources to label also other types of goods 
than primary products.  
An important way public authorities can support Fairtrade more generally is by public 
procurement of Fairtrade goods. The EU has explicitly stated as a goal to promote the use of 
Fairtrade products, and there are several projects in the EU supporting Fairtrade.132 Fairtrade 
coffee and tea is now being sold at all parliament meetings, and Fairtrade products are sold in 
the cafeterias of the European Commission.133 In appendix C I briefly present the Fairtrade 
towns campaign, which has been particularly important to fair public procurement.  
By having lower duties for Fairtrade products, products produced in a fair manner 
could be given a competitive advantage over other products (a type of preferential treatment). 
However, it is unclear whether this would be accepted by the WTO. 
                                                 
130 See Snoen (2004:142). 
131 See Hagen (2000:122). 
132 See Terragni, Jacobsen, Roos, Torjusen and Vittersø (2006:42-3). 
133 Fair Trade Advocacy Office (2005:5). 
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6   Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have studied Fairtrade and ethical consumption, with the aim of deriving broad 
implications for public policy. I considered two welfare aspects. First, I argued that many 
North consumers have altruistic preferences for the welfare of South workers, and that 
Fairtrade may provide these consumers with additional value. I then discussed at a general 
level possible welfare implications in the South of ethical consumption. On the one hand, fair 
consumers can promote fair production by rewarding fair firms and punishing unfair firms. 
On the other hand, ethical consumption can have negative effects, as in the case when a 
boycott causes workers to lose their job, and the job in an unfair firm after all was better than 
their alternative. 
A first question is whether there is any need for public policy at all, or whether a 
private market can realize the “desired” level of Fairtrade. I have argued that there are market 
failures in the provision of information about the ethical characteristics of goods. The problem 
essentially arises from firms’ private information about their production conditions, and the 
fact that it is costly for consumers to search such information themselves. Consumers might 
therefore be sceptical about firms’ own claims to fairness. This can lead North consumers to 
feel ethical risk in connection with the purchases of products from the South. This problem is 
partly alleviated by independent, non-profit altruistic agents like Fairtrade. These certify fair 
products and sum up the ethical information in a simple product label, which makes ethical 
consumption much less costly. However, there might be limits to the resources of such 
altruistic agents. Even though they have been able to label simple products like coffee, 
labelling products with a longer and more complex production chain might be too expensive. I 
have therefore argued that there seems to be a need for public policy. 
 The second question is what type of public policy is preferable. One type of public 
policy is to “help” the market by providing ethical information to consumers, to allow them to 
choose between fair and unfair products. Another type of public policy, regulation, goes 
further and requires all production in the South to be fair. There is thus a contrast between 
policies that seek to facilitate ethical consumption, and policies that seek to regulate 
production itself. 
 I then set up a model to study the welfare effects of four possible public policies: 1. 
Labelling all products from the South with respect to their fairness; 2. Guaranteeing a fair 
alternative to consumers; 3. ensuring all South products are fair through international 
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standards; and 4. Using public ethical investment to ensure fairness in South firms. The model 
incorporated North consumers’ ethical risk and the few outside options of South individuals. 
The main mechanism in the model works through prices, with fair goods normally being able 
to take a higher price than unfair goods. 
 For Public policy 1, labelling all products from the South, the main results were as 
follows. First, if there is no consumer fairness, ethical labelling is irrelevant, since consumers 
in any case buy the cheapest products. With intermediate fairness, fair products receive a 
higher price than the price for goods “Made in South”, while unfair products receive a lower 
price. Because they receive a higher price for their products, fair firms can expand their 
production and employ more workers. This leads to increased welfare for these workers. 
However, unfair firms will receive a lower price for their products, and some workers may 
lose their job and end up in the informal sector with a very low income. Therefore, some of 
the costs for unfair firms from being boycotted by ethical consumers are passed on to the 
South workers. Fair consumers in the North who are now able to buy guaranteed fair products 
have a higher welfare, as do the least fair consumers who can now buy a cheaper South good. 
 If there are ex ante no fair firms in the South market, ethical labelling may have only 
negative effects, since the lower price for unfair products means reduced demand for labour in 
the South. Also the welfare of North consumers is reduced. However, a higher fair price may 
allow fair firms to enter the South market. Effects are then as in the case with ex ante fair 
firms in the South market. 
 With high fairness, the price for fair products is sufficiently higher than the price for 
unfair products to make fair production most profitable. Then also profit-maximizing firms 
switch to fair production, and all regular production in the South is fair. All South workers 
experience a welfare improvement (except possibly some workers who lose their job in the 
profit-maximizing firm if the net effects on its demand from changing to fair production are 
negative). Also most North consumers are better off, except the least fair consumers who no 
longer have the option of a cheap unfair good. 
Ethical labelling thus will usually have some positive and some negative effects. 
However, if there is ex post no fair alternative available to consumers, there are only negative 
effects. This means that it is important to ensure that there is a fair firm in the market. In 
addition, as ethical labelling is irrelevant for consumers who are not concerned with fairness, 
guaranteeing a fair alternative might be a more efficient way to reach ethical consumers. 
Public policy 2 is guaranteeing a fair alternative. This could be done by certifying 
existing fair firms as fair. The main results were as follows. First, with no fairness, a fair 
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alternative is irrelevant if its price is higher, since consumers in any case buy the cheapest 
product. With intermediate fairness, certified fair firms receive a higher price and are able to 
employ more workers. However, there might be negative effects for the workers in the unfair 
firm, if the fair alternative leads to consumers to reduce their probability that the non-certified 
products from the South are fair. This is because the non-certified South good then receives a 
lower price. If there are ex ante no fair firms, the authorities have to ensure a fair alternative 
themselves. This could be done e.g. by public ethical investment (see below). With high 
fairness, also profit-maximizing firms change to fair production and have their products 
certified, as fair production is most profitable. Effects are then the same as for ethical 
labelling and high fairness. 
Public policy 3, international standards, differs from the other two strategies in that 
profit-maximizing firms no longer have the option of unfair production, and consumers 
therefore have only the fair alternative. At the same time, if consumers are aware of the 
standards, they will know that all South products are fair. 
With no fairness, the effects of international standards may be predominantly negative. 
Though some workers receive the higher fair wage, many others may lose their job. Also, 
North consumers are worse off since the price of the South good increases. With intermediate 
fairness, effects depend on whether consumers are aware of the standards. If they are, all 
South products receive the fair price. This means that fair firms can employ more workers. It 
also means that the reduction in employment in profit-maximizing firms due to the higher 
costs of respecting standards is smaller, because they receive a higher price for their products. 
However, if consumers are not informed, effects are similar to those when there is no fairness. 
With high fairness and informed consumers, standards are irrelevant since fair production in 
any case is most profitable. Effects are then the same as for the two policies described above. 
However, if consumers are not informed, standards again may have predominantly negative 
effects, even though consumers now would in fact be willing to finance the higher costs of 
respecting the standards. An important policy implication seems to be that an introduction of 
international standards needs to be combined with informing consumers. 
Finally, I briefly discussed Public policy 4, ethical investment, here meaning that the 
authorities require fair production in the firms they own. Ethical investment might e.g. be a 
way of ensuring a fair alternative to consumers when there are no fair firms in the South 
market. The effects are similar to those of international standards. However, public ethical 
investment cannot cover all South firms.  
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 In my view, the main implications for public policy are as follows. First, the analysis 
suggests that helping consumers in ethical consumption can have beneficial effects both for 
consumers in the North who have altruistic preferences, but also for many workers in the 
South. However, there might also be negative effects if consumers have no fair alternative. 
Conversely, requiring fair production might have harmful consequences if one cannot exploit 
consumers’ fairness. Therefore, there is a need for co-ordination of fair producers and fair 
consumers. This is exactly what Fairtrade means. The main message in this thesis is that 
public policy may have a role in coordinating agents. Of the policies discussed, guaranteeing 
a fair alternative seems to offer most of the positive effects while minimizing possible 
negative effects. However, a question is whether certifying fair products will lead consumers 
to believe that other products from the South are not fair. Still, in practice I do not think this 
effect is very important. 
I also emphasize that I defined high consumer fairness as the fairness of consumers 
necessary to make fair production absolutely more profitable. The actual extent of fairness, 
and therefore additional willingness-to-pay required of course depends on how large is the 
cost of fair production relative to unfair production. In particular, if these extra costs are not 
particularly high, consumers do not need to be willing to pay lot more for fair production. To 
better determine the effects of different policies, we therefore need to estimate both the extra 
willingness of consumers to pay for fair production, as well as the extra cost of fair 
production.134  
I now look at some qualifications to the analysis. First, readers have probably missed a 
discussion of the possibilities of implementing the various public policies. Throughout I have 
assumed away such problems, but in practical policy, they must be taken into consideration. 
As regards labelling, an example is the scepticism of many activists that consumers can drive 
change by shopping for the right pair of jeans.135 As they see it, the problems are structural, 
and require action at the industry level, rather than the firm level. Even if there is a 
willingness to pay among consumers for fair products, it will be some time before the systems 
for ethical sourcing and monitoring are in place. Further, some have questioned the ability of 
schemes like Fairtrade to monitor that standards are in fact being fulfilled. For instance, 
Tucker (2006) refers to allegations that coffee from a plantation in Peru where workers were 
paid below the minimum wage, was being sold as Fairtrade coffee. However, to the extent 
                                                 
134 Simon Pahle has argued that though there will be costs for the developing countries from respecting 
standards, these are unlikely to be so high as to take away their competitive advantage (Ny Tid nr. 47, 1.-7. 
desember 2006, p.55). 
135 See Engler (2006). 
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that such problems are due to lack of resources, public support could both hasten the 
development of systems for ethical sourcing, and strengthen monitoring capabilities of 
organizations like Fairtrade. 
It has also been argued that international standards will not be effective. One reason is 
the lack in many South countries of functioning bureaucracy and law and order, and problems 
of corruption. Even existing standards are only therefore implemented only to a limited 
extent.136 Further, as the WTO process is based on consensus, it seems unlikely that one can 
reach agreement on standards that will have any practical significance.137 In addition, as was 
also reflected in the analysis, standards will not cover the informal sector, which in many 
countries employs the majority of workers.138 Most economists do not see trade policy as an 
efficient tool for addressing the problem of labour standards. However, I would like to 
reiterate the result from the analysis that the fulfilment of international standards is maybe not 
a cost increase like any other cost increase. If consumers are fair, the fulfilment of standards 
might activate a higher willingness to pay for South products.  
Another qualification is the following. In the analysis, I assumed that firms are able to 
determine whether fair production is most profitable or not. In practice this is unrealistic. 
Possibly, we have a “hen-and-the-egg”-situation, where consumers do not buy Fairtrade 
products because they are not available, while the firms do not offer such products because 
they are unsure of whether consumers will buy them.139 Public policy could perhaps here help 
by co-ordinating agents. 
Finally, just some words on a possible interesting perspective on Fairtrade. 
Throughout, I have assumed consumers’ preferences for Fairtrade to be exogenously given 
and constant. However, these might themselves be endogenous to various factors, such as 
institutional arrangements, or social norms.140 
                                                 
136 Snoen (2004:139). 
137 Snoen (2004:139), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001:448-52). 
138 Snoen (2004:139). However, as Gaarder (2004) notes, many firms in the textile industry lay off workers from 
their factories, and instead employ them as home-workers. Regulation might in these cases help workers have 
more stable and secure employment in regular production. 
139 This point was mentioned in the NORAD-seminars on trade with developing countries in 2006. 
140 See Nyborg (2006d) for a discussion of social norms and the possible effects of public policy. 
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Appendix A   Fairtrade producer standards principles 
Standard Principles - The following Fairtrade Standards principles are considered in all 
Fairtrade Standards applicable to small farmers and workers and their organizations: 
Fairtrade Standards distinguish between minimum requirements, which producers must meet 
to be certified, and progress requirements that encourage producer organisations to 
continuously improve in all standard's areas and to invest in the development of the 
organizations and their producers/workers. This concept is developed for the target group of 
Fairtrade; disadvantaged producers. It encourages sustainable, social, economic and 
environmental development of producers and their organizations.  
1) Social development: For small farmers Fairtrade Standards require an organizational 
structure that allows the farmers to actually bring a product to the market. All members of the 
organization need to have access to democratic decision-making processes and as far as 
possible participate in the activities of the organization. The organization needs to be set up in 
a transparent way for its members and must not discriminate any particular member or social 
group.  
For hired labour situations the Fairtrade Standards require from the company to bring social 
rights and security to its workers. Some of the core elements are: training opportunities, non 
discriminatory employment practises, no child labour, no forced labour, access to collective 
bargaining processes and freedom of association of the workforce, condition of employment 
exceeding legal minimum requirements, adequate occupational safety and health conditions 
and sufficient facilities for the workforce to manage the Fairtrade Premium.  
2) Economic development: For all products Fairtrade Standards require the buyers to pay a 
Fairtrade Minimum Price and/or a Fairtrade Premium to the producers. The Fairtrade 
Minimum Price allows the producer to cover the costs of sustainable production. The 
Fairtrade premium is money for the farmers or for the workers on a plantation to invest in 
improving their livelihood. Premium money in this sense is meant to improve the situation of 
local communities in health, education, environment, economy etc. The farmers or workers 
decide themselves on what are the most important priorities for them and manage the use of 
the Fairtrade Premium.  
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Also, Fairtrade Standards require buyers to give a financial advance on contracts, called pre-
financing, if producers ask for it. This is to help producers to have access to capital and so 
overcome what can be one of the biggest obstacles to their development. This promotes 
entrepreneurship and can assist the economic development of entire rural communities.  
3) Environmental development: Fairtrade Standards include requirements for 
environmentally sound agricultural practises. The focus areas are: minimized and safe use of 
agrochemicals, proper and safe management of waste, maintenance of soil fertility and water 
resources and no use of genetically modified organisms. However, Fairtrade Standards do not 
require organic certification as part of its standards. Higher costs for organic production are 
considered though, by higher Fairtrade Minimum Prices for organically grown products.  
Fairtrade Standards principles specific to small farmers’ organizations only 
• The Members must be Small Producers. The majority of the members of the 
organization must be small producers who don’t depend on hired workers all the 
time, but run their farm mainly by using their own and their family’s labour.  
• Democracy. Profits should be equally distributed among the producers. All 
members have a voice and vote in the decision-making process of the 
organization. 
Fairtrade Standards principles specific to Hired Labour situations only 
• Management of the Fairtrade Premium. The so-called Joint Body, which 
includes workers and management, is, among other functions, responsible for the 
management of the Fairtrade Premium in accordance with Fairtrade Standards.  
• Forced labour & child labour. Forced labour and child labour is prohibited.  
• Freedom of association & collective bargaining. Workers have the right to join 
an independent union to collectively negotiate their working conditions.  
• Working conditions. Working conditions are equitable for all workers. Salaries 
must be equal or higher than the regional average or than the minimum wage in 
effect. Health and safety measures must be established in order to avoid work-
related injuries. 
Source: FLO (2006e). See FLO (2005, 2006a) for the detailed Generic Fairtrade standards for 
small farmers organizations and hired labour situations respectively.
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Appendix B Some sources of ethical information 
In this appendix, I give some examples of sources of ethical information, taken from Terragni, 
Jacobsen, Roos, Torjusen and Vittersø (2006:51-3) and Table 5.1 in Berry and McEachern 
(2005:75) I have focused on sources relevant in connection with the concerns of Fairtrade. In 
addition, there are many sites e.g. for environmental concerns. 
 
Websites 
www.ethiscore.org  
www.responsibleshopper.org  
 Online ethical shopper’s guide. 
www.ethicalconsumer.org  
 Homepage of the British ethical consumer organization. 
www.etiskforbruk.no  
Norwegian portal for ethical consumption. 
www.norwatch.no  
 Norwegian site for monitoring Norwegian businesses’ activities in the South. 
www.cleanclothes.org 
Campaign for improving conditions in the global garment industry. 
www.socialinvest.org  
 Website for social and ethical investment. 
www.corporatecritic.org  
www.corporatewatch.org.uk  
Online information about companies. 
http://www.coopamerica.org/socialinvesting/shareholderaction/    
 For individual investors seeking information on shareholder action. 
www.amnesty.org  
 Amnesty International website. 
 
Books and magazines 
The Rough Guide to Ethical Shopping  
The Ethical Consumer Magazine (also available online)
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Appendix C Fairtrade towns 
 
In this appendix I briefly present the Fairtrade town campaign, which has been important for 
public “fair” procurement.  
Fairtrade towns make commitments on among other things public purchases of 
Fairtrade products and on spreading information about Fairtrade. The campaign started in 
England, with Garstang becoming the first Fairtrade town in 2000. There are now 173 
Fairtrade towns in Great Britain.141 In August 2006, Sauda became Norway’s first Fairtrade 
town.142 Today there is active work in 25 Norwegian communes to have local politicians 
make binding commitments.143 
To become a Fairtrade town, or any other populated area, the following 5 goals must 
be met:144 
• The local council must pass a resolution supporting Fairtrade, and serve 
Fairtrade coffee and tea at its meetings and in offices and canteens. 
• A range of Fairtrade products must be readily available in the area’s shops 
and served in local cafés and catering establishments (targets are set in 
relation to population) 
• Fairtrade products must be used by a number of local work places (estate 
agents, hairdressers etc) and community organisations (churches, schools 
etc). 
• Attract media coverage and popular support for the campaign. 
• A local Fairtrade steering group must be convened to ensure continued 
commitment to Fairtrade Town status. 
 
 
                                                 
141 Ny Tid nr. 12, 24.-30. mars 2006, pp. 26-7 
142 Aftenposten, morgen, 20.08.2006, pp. 14-5. 
143 Aftenposten, morgen, 29.12.2006, p.22. 
144 Fairtrade Foundation (2007). 
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Appendix D Fairtrade products in Norwegian 
supermarket chains 
Source: Fairtrade Max Havelaar Norge (2007b). Note for non-Norwegian readers: ”Alle 
butikker” (A) means all outlets and  ”Noen butikker” (N) means some outlets. 
 
 Coffee   Juice  Bananas  Tea  Rice  Chocolate  Roses  Sugar 
Meny  A  A  A  A  A  N    A  
Centra  A  A  A  A  A  N     A  
Ultra  A  A  A  A  A  N     A  
Spar  A  A             N  
Joker  A               N  
Kiwi  A               N  
Nærmat  A               N  
Rema 1000  A               N  
Rimi  A               N  
ICA Supermarked  A  N  N  N         N  
ICA Maxi  A  A  A  A         N  
ICA Nær  A  A  N  N         N  
COOP Mega    A  N  N    N    N  
COOP Obs    A  N  N    N    N  
Eurospar  A  A            N   
Bunnpris  A  N             N  
Sparmat  A               N  
Drageset  A  A  A  A  A       N  
Bikuben  A  A  A  A  A       N  
Safari  A  A  A  A  A       N  
Nærkjøpmenn  A               N  
Jacobs  A  A  A  A  A       N  
CC Marten  A  A  A  A         N  
Helgekjeden  A               N  
Price Club  A               N  
Butikkringen Østlandet AS  A               N  
OK-kjeden  A               N  
  A                
Livi  A                
Service Mat  A                
Deli DeLuca  A      N          
Helios  N      A    A      
Helsekostbutikker  N      N    N      
Mester Grønn              A  A  
                  
A = Alle butikker                  
N = Noen butikker                  
 
